Weekly Digest
March 21 – March 27, 2026
79 opinions this week
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In a Collin County family law case, a father sought mandamus relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals, challenging a denied motion for continuance and the alleged removal of a recusal motion from the docket. The court analyzed the petition under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l) and 52.7, which require the person seeking relief to provide a record containing certified or sworn copies of all material documents. The court held that because the relator failed to provide an authenticated and complete record, he did not meet his burden of proof, and the court denied the petition without reaching the underlying merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural rules for appeals are not just technicalities; they are the gateway to relief. Even if a trial court's order is arguably 'void' or unfair, an appellate court will not intervene unless you provide a properly authenticated and complete record of the proceedings.”
Diamond Hydraulics, Inc. v. GAC Equipment, LLC d/b/a Austin Crane Service
SCOTX
In a commercial breach-of-contract/warranty dispute where causation turned on expert engineering testimony, the defendant timely designated an expert but, after multiple resets, its testifying expert became unavailable shortly before trial due to a job change, relocation out of state, and an express refusal to testify. The defendant promptly notified the other side and moved to substitute another engineer from the same firm who had helped prepare the report, offering to limit the substitute to the same opinions. The trial court excluded the substitute under Tex. R. Civ. P. 193.6, denied continuances, and forced the defendant to try the case with no causation expert; the jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and the court of appeals affirmed. The Texas Supreme Court held that Rule 193.6’s “good cause” exception, while demanding, is not an “impossible” standard, and that the trial court misapplied the rule by rigidly denying substitution when the unavailability was outside the party’s control and the party acted promptly and in good faith to mitigate any prejudice. Because the exclusion was effectively case-dispositive in an expert-driven case, the error was reversible; the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a properly designated expert becomes genuinely unavailable near trial (job change, relocation, refusal to testify), don’t assume you’re stuck: act immediately, document the unavailability, offer a true substitute with the same opinions, and propose cure measures (deposition/limited continuance). Courts cannot weaponize Rule 193.6 deadlines to force trial without essential expert proof when the problem is outside your control and you move diligently.”
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved.”
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services.”
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection.”
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA05
In a juvenile delinquency jury trial for indecency with a child by contact, jurors reported that a State investigator seated in the gallery as the child complainant’s “support” repeatedly used gestures (e.g., “thumbs up,” motions to look at him, refocusing cues) that functionally coached the child during live testimony. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the conduct as State-sponsored interference with the juvenile’s right to confrontation and meaningful cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment and Texas Constitution art. I, § 10, emphasizing that confrontation protects not just physical presence but an opportunity to test credibility free from real-time outside shaping. Applying constitutional harm review, the court held the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the child’s testimony was central and credibility-driven, and the jury’s evaluation was tainted by observed prompting from a State agent. The court reversed the adjudication and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a child witness is testifying, a “support person” cannot become a coach. If any aligned adult is visible to the child and signals, gestures, or otherwise prompts answers during testimony, object and demand an immediate inquiry; build a record (including juror/counsel affidavits if discovered later) and seek striking testimony, mistrial/new trial, or appellate reversal. In family cases, use the same due-process/credibility framework to challenge the reliability of child testimony or statements and to request prophylactic courtroom controls (neutral support, no line-of-sight, no signaling, on-the-record admonishments).”
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice.”
Julia Ann Poff v. William Harvey Poff
COA09
In an appeal from the trial court’s denial of a family-violence protective order, the appellant perfected the appeal but never filed an appellate brief. After the Ninth Court of Appeals issued a deficiency notice with a cure deadline (requiring both a brief and a motion to extend) and expressly warned that the appeal could be dismissed, the appellant still filed nothing. The court submitted the case without briefs under Tex. R. App. P. 39.8 and, with no brief assigning error and no explanation for the default, treated the failure as a lack of prosecution. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), and 43.2(f), the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution, leaving the trial court’s denial of the protective order in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“A protective-order appeal won’t be decided on the merits if the appellant doesn’t prosecute it. Calendar briefing deadlines, respond immediately to clerk deficiency notices, and file a timely brief (or at least a motion to extend with a reasonable explanation) or the court can dismiss—cementing the trial court’s order and eliminating appellate leverage in parallel divorce/SAPCR litigation.”
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In an ongoing Collin County divorce case, the husband sought mandamus relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals on an emergency basis the day before a scheduled hearing. He asked the court to stay the next-day hearing, set aside a January 13, 2026 “final decree of divorce,” return a January 12, 2026 motion to recuse to the trial court’s docket, and compel discovery. The court did not analyze whether those complaints met the mandamus standards (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal) because the mandamus petition and record were procedurally deficient. Citing mandatory original-proceeding requirements under TRAP 52.3(k) (certification), 52.3(l)(1)(B) (appendix requirements), and 52.7(a) (mandamus record), and relying on prior Dallas cases enforcing those rules, the court held that TRAP 52 compliance is a gateway to merits review. Because the relator failed to comply in “numerous respects,” the court denied mandamus without reaching the merits and denied the emergency stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“In emergency family-law mandamus practice, TRAP 52 compliance is not optional—it is the ticket to get the court to consider your complaint. A missing/defective certification, appendix, or complete authenticated record can trigger a flat denial (even with a hearing the next day), and a stay request will fail with the petition.”
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
“A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial.”
In the Interest of A.B., A Child
COA05
In a divorce governed by a premarital agreement (PMA) eliminating community property and treating each spouse’s earnings as separate, the parties disputed ownership of a diamond ring purchased during marriage with Husband’s earnings and allegedly titled in his name. The trial court found the ring was initially Husband’s separate property under the PMA but that Husband later made an interspousal gift of the ring to Wife, confirming it as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting donative intent, delivery, and acceptance under the clear-and-convincing standard. Applying abuse-of-discretion review (with legal/factual sufficiency as factors) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Husband gifted the ring based on Wife’s testimony and circumstances: Wife selected/designed the ring, the jeweler delivered it to her, she wore it as her wedding ring for years, Husband bought a matching band later, he returned it after cleanings/appraisals, and he never demanded its return at separation. The court affirmed the decree confirming the ring as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even with a “no community property” premarital agreement, high-value personal items can still change character through an interspousal gift. At trial, build (or attack) the gift elements—donative intent, delivery, and acceptance—using the parties’ conduct over time (possession, daily use, repairs/cleanings, related purchases, and separation behavior), because on appeal a supported gift finding is difficult to overturn under abuse-of-discretion review.”
In the Interest of H.S., a Child
COA02
In a Texas child-protection/SAPCR appeal, the appellant failed to pay or make payment arrangements for the clerk’s record. After the district clerk notified the court of appeals of the nonpayment, the Second Court of Appeals issued a written notice giving the appellant ten days to (1) arrange payment and (2) file proof of those arrangements, expressly warning that the appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution if not cured. The appellant did nothing. Applying the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the appellant’s duty to fund the clerk’s record and the court’s authority to dismiss when the record is not filed due to nonpayment, the court concluded the defect was curable, that adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure were provided, and that the failure to act constituted a failure to prosecute. The court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas appeals can be lost on procedure before briefing: immediately confirm record costs, make payment arrangements that satisfy the clerk, and file proof with the court of appeals within any cure deadline. If you ignore a nonpayment notice, dismissal for want of prosecution is likely and your client may still be taxed with appellate costs—leaving the trial court’s orders fully in place and enforceable.”
In the Interest of J.B.S. and R.G.S., Children
COA13
In a Chapter 157 SAPCR enforcement proceeding, Mother sought contempt-style relief against Father for alleged violations of multiple prior orders. The trial court dismissed/denied the enforcement motion on threshold legal grounds (treating many alleged violations as pre-final-order and effectively barred) and signed an order denying enforcement. Mother attempted a direct appeal, arguing the denial was a final, appealable order under Texas Family Code § 109.002. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the proceeding and reiterated that contempt/enforcement determinations under Chapter 157 are not reviewable by direct appeal; any review lies, if at all, in mandamus (and habeas if confinement is ordered). Because the order was an unappealable enforcement/contempt ruling, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don’t assume a signed order that ends a Chapter 157 enforcement hearing is appealable. If the relief sought/ruling made is contempt-type enforcement, the correct review vehicle is usually mandamus (or habeas if confinement is involved); filing a direct appeal can waste time and jeopardize your client’s only effective remedy.”
In the Interest of I.S., a Child
COA10
In a termination of parental rights case, Mother timely requested a de novo hearing under Texas Family Code § 201.015 after an associate judge’s bench trial and proposed termination ruling. The referring district court began—but did not complete—the de novo hearing, then prematurely signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order (incorrectly reciting that no de novo demand had been made). Mother filed an accelerated notice of appeal the same day. The Tenth Court of Appeals held that, although procedurally erroneous, the adoption order was a final, appealable (voidable) judgment that triggered accelerated appellate deadlines and the running of the trial court’s plenary power. Because plenary power expired and appellate jurisdiction attached, the trial court lacked authority to later complete the de novo hearing or sign subsequent adoption/affirmance orders; those later actions were legal nullities and could not cure the § 201.015 violation. The court reversed the termination judgment and remanded for a proper de novo hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party timely requests a de novo hearing from an associate judge’s ruling, a referring court cannot sign an adoption order before completing the de novo hearing—and if it does, treat that adoption order as a final, deadline-triggering judgment immediately. File the accelerated appeal and/or plenary-power motions right away; do not assume the trial court can “fix it later,” because post-judgment de novo proceedings may be nullities once plenary power expires or an appeal is pending.”
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In a Dallas County post-judgment family case, the relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a hearing on a motion for jurisdictional production and a motion to disqualify. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied relief at the threshold because the petition omitted the mandatory Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k) certification that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record—an omission the court treated as an independently sufficient reason to deny mandamus. The court also held, in the alternative, that even with a compliant petition the relator failed to meet the two mandamus prerequisites under In re Prudential—showing neither a clear abuse of discretion nor that appeal was an inadequate remedy—so extraordinary relief compelling findings was not warranted on the record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in Texas is strict-compliance and strict-proof: include the TRAP 52.3(k) certification (and back every fact with record evidence) or your petition can be denied outright, and even then you must build a record that concretely shows both a clear abuse of discretion and why an appeal cannot fix the problem—especially for post-judgment “findings after a hearing” complaints.”
Robinson v. Kelley
COA01
In an appeal from a Brazoria County SAPCR modification order, the parties entered a later agreed modification order while the appeal was pending. Appellant’s counsel notified the First Court of Appeals by letter that the agreed order eliminated the need to continue the appeal, and appellee did not oppose. The court construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and, because appellant no longer sought appellate relief and there was no live controversy to resolve, dismissed the appeal under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a) and 43.2(f), also dismissing all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you settle a parenting-plan modification dispute during the appeal and the trial court signs an agreed modification order that replaces the challenged order, the court of appeals will typically end the case quickly—sometimes even treating an informal “no longer necessary” communication as a dismissal request. Be intentional: decide whether you want immediate dismissal, an abatement while performance occurs, or continued appellate leverage, and communicate that clearly in a formal motion whenever possible.”
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
“In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders.”
In the Interest of C.H., a Child
COA02
In a SAPCR enforcement action, Mother sought reimbursement for prenatal and postnatal medical expenses that the parties’ agreed order required Father to pay 50% of after Mother “furnish[ed]” receipts/bills/EOBs by a set deadline. Father admitted nonpayment but argued enforcement failed because Mother did not prove she provided the required documentation—particularly because the underlying bills and receipts were not admitted at the hearing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, construed the agreed order under contract principles, and rejected Father’s attempt to treat the “furnish by August 22” language as a condition precedent (noting the absence of clear conditional words like “if” or “provided that”). The court held that service evidence—Mother’s attorney’s reimbursement letter to Father’s attorney with an itemized list of providers, dates, and out-of-pocket amounts, plus electronic proof of email service—constituted some evidence that Mother complied with the order’s notice/documentation requirement, and the trial court was entitled to credit that proof over Father’s denial of receipt. The court affirmed the enforcement judgment awarding Mother $30,181 (plus interest) for unreimbursed prenatal and postnatal medical expenses.
Litigation Takeaway
“In enforcement of unreimbursed medical expenses (treated as additional child support), win or lose often turns on proving the process: documented, provable service of a reimbursement demand can satisfy “furnish/notice” provisions even if every underlying bill is not admitted, and a bare “I never got it” defense is unlikely to overcome credible service records—especially where the order’s notice language is drafted as a covenant, not a true condition precedent.”
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record.”
In the Interest of M.L. and E.L., Children
COA11
In a CPS termination appeal involving repeated cocaine use and newborn/child drug exposure, the Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for multiple pleaded predicate grounds under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)—endangering conditions/surroundings (D), endangering conduct (E), prior termination based on (D)/(E) (M), and “born addicted” (Q)—and for best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The record showed multiple positive drug tests by Mother and at least one child, removals of two children, and later relapse while pregnant; but it also showed substantial rehabilitation (counseling, medication management, completion of outpatient treatment, and sustained negative tests) and a Department-supported monitored return that later failed due to the live-in partner’s marijuana-positive test rather than Mother’s. Applying the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for termination, the court conducted a ground-by-ground audit, requiring a tight evidentiary fit between the statutory elements and the proof rather than relying on a generalized “drug case” narrative. The court therefore affirmed the termination order in part, but reversed and remanded in part because one or more of the challenged statutory grounds and/or related findings (including best-interest as tied to those grounds) were not supported by clear and convincing evidence on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even in strong drug-exposure cases, appellate courts will scrutinize each termination ground separately—so build an element-by-element record. If a third party’s drug use is the trigger (e.g., during a monitored return), prove the parent’s knowledge and protective capacity (or, for the defense, document prompt removal and safety measures). And if you plead “born addicted” under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), you must prove addiction/withdrawal with medical precision—not just exposure or suspicion.”
In re Francisco Gibran Morales
COA13
In an original proceeding arising from a child possession dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief to force the trial court to sign a written order that he claimed should have memorialized an alleged oral August 30, 2024 possession-modification ruling. He also challenged later possession-related enforcement/interim orders—including writs of attachment and an interim possession order—arguing the court relied on the wrong “controlling” possession order and issued relief without an evidentiary hearing. Applying Texas’s two-part mandamus standard, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals emphasized that mandamus is extraordinary and requires a record showing (1) a clear abuse of discretion or failure to perform a purely ministerial duty and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal. Because the mandamus record did not conclusively establish a ministerial duty to sign the specific proposed written order (i.e., a definite, rendered oral ruling that the proposed order accurately reflected), nor did it demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or why ordinary appellate remedies were inadequate as to the interim/enforcement orders, the court denied mandamus and lifted its prior stay.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus won’t fix an unclear or incomplete possession record. If you want extraordinary relief in a possession-modification/enforcement fight, you must (1) prove on a clean mandamus record that a specific, definite ruling was actually rendered and that signing a particular written order is ministerial, and (2) explain concretely why appeal is inadequate—especially when attacking interim possession or attachment/enforcement orders.”
Lonis v. Kinzie
COA02
In a Denton County family-law enforcement case, the trial court signed an order revoking a previously suspended commitment and enforcing support obligations, including contempt/commitment provisions and an arrearage money judgment. The pro se appellant attempted to appeal the December 8, 2025 enforcement order but filed the notice of appeal on February 2, 2026—after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline—and did not file any postjudgment motion extending the timetable or any timely motion for extension under the appellate rules. Applying Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, and 26.3 and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Verburgt, the Fort Worth court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the notice was untimely and no extension was sought; the appellant’s pro se status did not excuse noncompliance. The court also reiterated that contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal, so the contempt/commitment portions were independently nonappealable, and any attack on the arrearage judgment likewise failed due to the untimely notice. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law enforcement, deadlines and remedies are everything: calendar the notice-of-appeal deadline immediately for any arrearage money judgment, and don’t try to “appeal the contempt” (contempt is typically reviewable only by habeas if confined or, in limited cases, mandamus). A late notice of appeal without a timely extension request is jurisdictional and will get the entire appeal dismissed—even for pro se litigants.”
In the Interest of J.D., R.D.-G., K.G., and L.G., Children
COA02
In this case, the Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father following reports of drug use, child abandonment, and instability. The Father, who was incarcerated for deadly conduct throughout the case, challenged the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, signaling that her appeal lacked nonfrivolous legal issues. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the record under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, focusing on Father's history of incarceration, his minimization of Mother’s drug issues, and the children’s successful bonding within their foster placements. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination of both parents' rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest determinations often hinge on a parent's credibility and insight. Minimizing risks—such as ignoring a partner's drug use or failing to provide a concrete timeline for stability—can be fatal to a parent's case. For parents facing litigation, demonstrating accountability and providing a realistic, child-centered plan for the present is far more persuasive than making aspirational promises for the future.”
Strong v. State
COA02
In Strong v. State, a murder defendant sought a jury-charge instruction giving him the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. The trial court refused because the presumption under Texas Penal Code §§ 9.31 and 9.32 is unavailable when the actor is “engaged in criminal activity” at the time of the force. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals held the record conclusively showed Strong was engaged in criminal activity—unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code § 46.04—because he admitted he was a felon, knew he could not possess firearms, and used a firearm during the incident. Strong attempted to avoid the “criminal activity” bar by arguing § 46.04 was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, which (he claimed) would mean his possession was not “criminal activity” and the presumption instruction was required. The court rejected using an as-applied Second Amendment attack as a vehicle to obtain the presumption instruction on these facts and affirmed. Holding: the trial court did not err in denying the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction because Strong’s felon-in-possession status was contemporaneous criminal activity, and his as-applied constitutional challenge did not entitle him to the statutory presumption in the charge.
Litigation Takeaway
“When firearms are involved, a party’s prohibited-possessor status can strip away “presumptive reasonableness” / stand-your-ground framing. If the person with the gun was committing a firearms-possession offense at the time, Texas courts can treat that as contemporaneous “criminal activity” that defeats favorable self-defense presumptions—even if the party tries to reframe the issue with a constitutional challenge. In family cases, that supports protective orders, firearm surrender provisions, and best-interest arguments focused on ongoing illegality and risk.”
Estate of Samantha Skaggs; Robbin Skaggs, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Samantha Skaggs; and Walter Skaggs Sr. v. Peternett, Inc. d/b/a Showdown
COA02
In this Tarrant County case, the plaintiffs sued a bar under the Texas Dram Shop Act but failed to conduct any discovery during the applicable period. Although their pleadings stated they intended to conduct discovery under Level 3, they never obtained a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan. The trial court applied default Level 2 deadlines, quashed the plaintiffs' late discovery requests, denied a continuance, and granted a no-evidence summary judgment after striking the plaintiffs' unauthenticated evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that Level 2 rules govern by default unless a signed Level 3 order is entered, and the plaintiffs waived their right to contest the summary judgment by failing to challenge the exclusion of their evidence on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pleading for 'Level 3' discovery is not enough to extend your deadlines; you must obtain a signed Level 3 discovery-control plan from the court. Without that signed order, default Level 1 or Level 2 deadlines apply, and a failure to conduct discovery within those windows can lead to the quashing of late discovery and an indefensible no-evidence summary judgment. Furthermore, always ensure your summary judgment evidence is authenticated and specifically cited, as 'document dumps' are easily excluded.”
Claudia Lucius Williams Smith v. Kenneth Wayne Allen
COA14
In this heirship dispute, the court addressed whether a Harris County home purchased in 1972 was separate or community property. The resolution turned on whether the decedent, Lossie Mae Smith, was informally married to Tom Willie Smith at the time of purchase. The trial court found no informal marriage existed in 1972, pointing to a deed identifying Lossie as a single woman ("feme sole") and testimony from siblings that Tom was not in her life at that time. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that because a key letter supporting the marriage claim was never formally admitted into evidence—only placed in the court file—it lacked probative weight. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the separate-property characterization.
Litigation Takeaway
“Evidence that is merely 'in the court file' is not the same as evidence admitted at trial. To prove an informal marriage or challenge property characterization, you must formally admit your documents into evidence and preserve all procedural objections—such as concerns about legal representation or notice—at the trial level, or you risk losing your right to appeal those issues.”
Westcott Law Group PLLC v. Paychex, Inc.
COA14
Paychex obtained a judgment titled “Final Default Judgment” against Westcott Law Group after Westcott missed its answer deadline. But Westcott had transmitted an answer and counterpetition over the weekend, which—under Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5)—was deemed filed at midnight on the next business day, making Westcott’s counterclaims (conversion, fraud, and DTPA violations) on file when the trial court signed the default judgment that Monday. On restricted appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals first addressed jurisdiction and applied Texas finality law for non-conventional dispositions (including defaults): a judgment is final only if it actually disposes of all claims and parties or states with unmistakable clarity that it does so. Although the order was labeled “Final Default Judgment” and contained standard execution/enforcement language, it did not mention or dispose of Westcott’s counterclaims and did not include unequivocal all-claims/all-parties finality language. The court therefore held the judgment was interlocutory; and because Texas statutes authorize restricted appeals only from final judgments, no interlocutory restricted appeal was available. The court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving the counterclaims (and the case) pending in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not rely on a “final” caption. Before appealing—or enforcing—confirm the order either expressly disposes of every pleaded claim (including counterclaims, attorney’s fees, sanctions, reimbursement, and declaratory relief) or contains unmistakably clear all-claims/all-parties finality language. If anything remains pending, the “judgment” may be interlocutory, appellate deadlines may not run, and any attempted (restricted) appeal can be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”
Corey Morrell v. Burton Baker, Individually and in his Professional Capacity; Lummus, Hallman, Pritchard & Baker, P.C.; and Mercer Transportation Co., Inc.
COA02
In a multi‑defendant, multi‑claim lawsuit, the trial court granted a combined Rule 91a and TCPA motion, dismissing several causes of action “with prejudice,” but the same order stated that the plaintiff’s “only remaining claims” were certain numbered counts in a referenced “Third Amended Petition.” The record did not contain that pleading, and the plaintiff pointed out the order’s internal inconsistency (dismissed claim titles versus allegedly surviving numbered counts). The trial court denied a motion to clarify and later signed a separate order awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 91a.7 and TCPA § 27.009(a)(1), including a Mother Hubbard clause and enforcement language, and it restricted discovery as to one defendant until fees were paid. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed finality under Lehmann/Elizondo by looking first to the face of the orders and then the record. Because the dismissal order itself indicated claims remained pending and was ambiguous/internally inconsistent about what survived, and because the fee order contemplated ongoing litigation and did not supply unmistakable finality language, the court held there was no final judgment disposing of all claims and parties. With no applicable statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal in this posture, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Rule 91a/TCPA win plus a fee award is not automatically appealable. Before noticing appeal, confirm the order unmistakably disposes of all claims and all parties (or obtain a severance). Do not rely on a Mother Hubbard clause or enforcement language to create finality—any “remaining claims” language, references to the wrong live pleading, or other internal inconsistencies can trigger a jurisdictional dismissal and waste months while the trial court case keeps moving.”
Ava Washington v. Margaret Victoria
COA01
In a probate will contest arising from a late-in-life hospice will, the proponent of a 2016 will argued the decedent changed his estate plan because his daughter had financially exploited him, while the daughter contended the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to end-stage illness and cognitive impairment. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient under City of Keller/“more than a scintilla” review for a reasonable jury to find the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time of execution. However, the court reversed and remanded because the trial court allowed testimony supporting an inflammatory “she took his money” narrative to explain motive for disinheritance, yet excluded the daughter’s responsive rebuttal evidence. The court treated this one-sided evidentiary ruling as an abuse of discretion and concluded the exclusion probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, making the error harmful and requiring a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the court lets your opponent introduce a damaging “financial exploitation/bad actor” story to sway motive and credibility, you must be allowed to rebut it. Preserve the issue with a clear offer of proof and a ruling—because even where the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence, an asymmetrical evidentiary ruling that leaves the jury with an unanswered accusation can be reversible harmful error.”
Carlos Franco Hernandez a/k/a Carlos Alberto Hernandez Orta v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a criminal appeal arising from sexual assault allegations involving a 13-year-old, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed two trial objections that commonly surface in family-law crossover cases: (1) whether the jury charge improperly included a Penal Code § 8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction when the defendant did not affirmatively plead intoxication as a defense, and (2) whether admitting the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) nurse’s written report was reversible error as improper “bolstering.” The court held the intoxication instruction was proper because the record contained evidence of drinking from multiple sources (including the defendant’s admissions and the history reflected in the SANE documentation), and Texas law allows the instruction whenever evidence could lead jurors to think intoxication excuses conduct; the instruction tracked the statute and did not comment on the weight of the evidence. The court also held the SANE report was not excludable or reversible on a “bolstering” theory; bolstering is not a free-standing basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the argument largely collapses into hearsay/predicate issues that were not the focus of the appellate complaint. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When dealing with SANE/medical records and repeated narratives in SAPCR or protective-order trials, “bolstering” is usually the wrong objection—and often an easy one to defeat if the exhibit is independently admissible. The real battleground is foundation, purpose, and embedded hearsay (plus Rule 403/redactions). Also, if intoxication evidence is in the record, expect courts to give clarifying/limiting instructions to prevent a “drinking excuses it” theme—so plan your proof and objections accordingly and preserve the correct grounds.”
Holloway v. State
COA02
In an indecency-by-exposure prosecution, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to the State’s use of “context” evidence surrounding the charged incident: a non-graphic photo of the child complainant and testimony about closely timed, related encounters (an earlier exposure-like incident involving the child’s mother, a later door-checking/Ring-video incident at her home, and another school-area exposure-type event). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Rule 403’s pro-admission presumption and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, emphasizing that evidence is not excluded merely because it is harmful; exclusion requires that unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value. Because the defense made intent (intent to arouse or gratify) a contested issue, the surrounding-incident evidence had heightened probative force to show sexual intent and to provide a coherent narrative explaining recognition and the complainant’s mother’s reactions. The court also noted safeguards reducing 403 risk, including limiting instructions and the absence of undue delay or cumulativeness. It held the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement in admitting both the contextual testimony and the child’s photograph and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 403 is a “substantial imbalance” rule, not a “keep it nice” rule: when intent, danger, or credibility is disputed, closely connected prior/other incidents and contextual photos can come in to “connect the dots,” especially if you (1) tie the evidence to a specific contested issue (intent/absence of mistake/fear), (2) show tight temporal and factual proximity, (3) keep the presentation non-cumulative, and (4) request/offer limiting instructions. Conversely, if you argue accident/mistake/innocent intent, expect the court to allow more context evidence and preserve your position with targeted objections and Rule 105 limits.”
City of Houston v. Sancelia Fonteneaux
COA14
A plaintiff sued the City of Houston (and METRO) for negligence after a bus door allegedly closed on her arm while she was boarding. The City sought dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing the pleadings showed no Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) motor‑vehicle waiver because the bus was operated by METRO, a separate entity, not a City employee. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Rule 91a’s pleading-only framework—accepting the petition’s facts as true, liberally construing them, and drawing reasonable inferences—and held the live petition plausibly alleged the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) by alleging the injury arose from the operation/use of a motor vehicle and, alternatively, that the bus was owned/operated/maintained and/or driven by the City (or METRO), permitting an inference at the pleading stage that a City employee acting within scope could have operated the bus. The court also refused the City’s request to render judgment based on its pending traditional summary-judgment motion because the trial court had not ruled and Rule 91a does not allow evidence-based, “backdoor summary judgment” review. The denial of the Rule 91a motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 91a is not a shortcut to win an immunity or “wrong entity” fight on disputed facts. If the petition pleads a concrete motor-vehicle injury mechanism and plausibly ties operation of the vehicle to a governmental unit—even in the alternative—the case will usually survive early dismissal and move into discovery; defendants should use evidence-based tools (plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment) rather than a pleading-only Rule 91a attack.”
Hendrickson v. State
COA10
In an indecency-with-a-child prosecution, the State called the child’s treating counselor, an LPC-Associate, to testify that she diagnosed the child with PTSD using the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and to explain treatment goals. The defense objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, arguing the associate lacked the training/experience allegedly required by 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 681.43 to administer and interpret the CATS, and also objected that the testimony would improperly “bolster” the child’s testimony. The Waco Court of Appeals applied the Rule 702/Vela framework and abuse-of-discretion review, holding the record supported the trial court’s gatekeeping decision: the witness testified she learned the CATS in graduate school, received continuing training, and routinely used the tool with many patients, which was enough for the trial court to reasonably find qualification and reliability (within the “zone of reasonable disagreement”). The court also rejected the “bolstering” complaint because “bolstering” is an ambiguous objection and the trial objection did not clearly invoke a specific evidentiary rule or match the more developed arguments raised on appeal, so error was not preserved under TRAP 33.1/comportment principles.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family cases involving child-trauma/PTSD opinions, licensure level alone (e.g., LPC-Associate vs. psychologist) is not dispositive under Rule 702—what matters is a record showing tool-specific training and repeated, competent use. If you are opposing the testimony, do not rely on a generic “bolstering” objection; pin the challenge to a конкрет rule and theory (Rule 702 qualification/reliability/fit, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, or hearsay/conduit limits) and preserve it with a clear, matching objection and ruling.”
Payne v. Boyd
COA04
In Payne v. Boyd, a nonlawyer brother (Donald) attempted to prosecute a lawsuit for the named plaintiff (Darrell) based on a power of attorney arising from Darrell’s pending criminal matter. Defendants filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting Donald lacked capacity and standing. The Fourth Court of Appeals distinguished capacity (a procedural defect that must be raised by verified pleading under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93) from standing (a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised by plea to the jurisdiction and is not waivable). Because defendants did not file a Rule 93 verified pleading, any capacity challenge was waived. But Donald still lacked standing because he pleaded no personal injury to himself and could not manufacture standing by claiming agency under a POA to assert Darrell’s constitutional/statutory claims. The standing defect deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismissal was proper without leave to replead because the defect was incurable as to Donald.
Litigation Takeaway
“A power of attorney is not a license to litigate. Even if the other side fails to preserve a Rule 93 verified “capacity” objection, you can still knock out proxy-driven filings by attacking standing with a plea to the jurisdiction—standing is nonwaivable and requires the filer to allege their own concrete injury. Preserve both: verified Rule 93 capacity challenge + plea to the jurisdiction on standing.”
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a divorce case, the trial court’s final decree required the wife to sell a New Mexico residence for “fair market value.” The husband later sought enforcement and a receiver; the trial court found the decree too indefinite for contempt but issued a post-judgment “clarification order” defining “fair market value” and awarding the husband attorney’s fees and costs. While that clarification-order appeal was pending, the Dallas Court of Appeals in a separate appeal partially reversed and remanded the community-property division of the same divorce decree due to a valuation error involving performance units. Because the clarification order was tethered to the now-reversed/remanded property-division framework, any decision about the decree’s ambiguity or the propriety of the clarification would not affect the parties’ rights going forward, making the appeal moot. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the clarification order in full, including the fee and cost award.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you pursue (or defend) clarification/enforcement orders while the property division is on appeal, a later partial reversal/remand of the decree can render those post-judgment orders moot and wipe out associated attorney’s-fee awards. Manage parallel proceedings carefully, consider sequencing/abatement, and preserve independent bases for fees and relief that can survive changes to the underlying decree.”
Jose Guevara-Molina v. The State of Texas
COA04
In this Texas criminal appeal, the defendant challenged six convictions for knowing possession of child pornography found on his cell phone, arguing the State failed to prove he knowingly possessed the images and separately complaining about admission of message screenshots. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code § 43.26’s “care, custody, control, or management + knowledge” concept, the Fourth Court of Appeals treated the proof as a combined-force, circumstantial-evidence case: (1) the phone was seized from the defendant’s person and he admitted it was his (including the number and length of ownership), supporting control of the device; (2) a forensic extraction located the images in multiple locations on the phone, including a user-restricted “private folder,” supporting an inference of knowing retention rather than accidental presence; and (3) the defendant’s admissions (including identifying the child depicted) and related message traffic supported knowledge of the images’ existence and character. The court rejected the argument that the State had to prove he created, saved, moved, or viewed the files. On the evidentiary issue, the court held the complaint was waived because trial counsel objected on hearsay grounds, but on appeal argued lack of authentication; the appellate theory did not comport with the trial objection under Texas preservation rules. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any case turning on “digital possession” (including SAPCR and protective-order hearings), you can prove control and knowledge without a smoking-gun admission by stacking: device nexus (seized from person/owned), forensic artifacts in multiple locations (especially secure/private folders), and contextual admissions/messages. And if you want appellate leverage, object on the right ground—mislabeling an authentication problem as “hearsay” can waive your best issue.”
Daniel Matthew Bible v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this criminal appeal with family-law crossover implications, the defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction as to alleged “breast” touching. Although the complainant initially answered “No” when asked directly whether her breast was touched and described the contact as stopping at the “bra line,” the court reviewed the entire record under the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the jury’s role as factfinder. The jury saw the complainant demonstrate the hand movement across her chest and reviewed an admitted body diagram she highlighted to show the area touched. A forensic interviewer testified that the complainant’s “bra line” demonstration included the breast, and a forensic nurse explained that young children have breast tissue and that the highlighted area encompassed the breasts. Considering the demonstrations, diagram, and corroborating contextual evidence, the Third Court of Appeals held a rational juror could find breast contact beyond a reasonable doubt and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don’t assume a witness’s damaging sound-bite answer (e.g., “No, he didn’t touch my breast”) defeats an abuse allegation when the testimony includes location descriptors (“bra line”), in-court demonstrations, and marked diagrams. Courts can treat demonstrative evidence—especially when supported by CAC/forensic interviewer and medical testimony—as enough to prove anatomically specific contact, and factfinders may credit that totality over semantic inconsistencies. In custody/protective-order litigation, build (or attack) the foundation and clarity of diagrams/gestures and the “translator” testimony that links imprecise language to legally significant anatomy.”
In the Interest of K.D.R., a Child
COA05
In a Dallas SAPCR appeal, the appellant failed to respond to the court of appeals’ inquiry about the reporter’s record, leading the court to order submission without a reporter’s record and to set a firm briefing deadline. The appellant then failed to file any appellate brief by the ordered due date and ignored a subsequent delinquency notice that gave an additional ten days and expressly warned the appeal would be dismissed. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1) (failure to file brief after notice) and 42.3(b) and (c) (want of prosecution and failure to comply with court orders/rules), the Fifth Court of Appeals treated the appeal as abandoned and dismissed it without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, the merits don’t matter if the appeal is procedurally abandoned: promptly address reporter’s record issues, calendar briefing deadlines, and respond immediately to delinquency notices or risk outright dismissal under TRAP 38.8 and 42.3—locking in the trial court’s SAPCR orders.”
In re Jesus Ybarra
COA07
In an adult parentage suit, the trial court ordered the alleged father (relator) to submit to genetic testing. Although he sought a stay and obtained a written order plus findings and conclusions, he did not file for mandamus until almost a year later—after the court issued a renewed testing deadline and warned noncompliance could lead to contempt. The Seventh Court of Appeals treated mandamus as an equity-governed remedy and held the unexplained delay was unreasonable and barred relief; a later contempt warning did not “restart the clock” or create new mandamus issues because the relator’s statutory/constitutional complaints (retroactivity, privacy, due process) were the same when the original testing order was issued. The court also rejected the relator’s request to prospectively prohibit a future contempt proceeding on double-jeopardy grounds as unripe and an impermissible advisory opinion. Mandamus was denied without reaching the merits of the challenges to the testing order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plan to challenge a genetic-testing (or other intrusive, effectively unreviewable) family-law order by mandamus, act fast—equity favors the diligent, and waiting until enforcement ramps up or contempt is threatened is often too late. Contempt warnings usually don’t reset mandamus deadlines, and appellate courts won’t pre-approve defenses to hypothetical future contempt proceedings.”
Andy Jerome Williams v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a drug-trafficking prosecution arising from cocaine found in a concealed “trap” in a truck the defendant was driving, the defendant sought to shift blame to a third party (the truck’s insured) by offering evidence that the third party was arrested about ten months later for a similar, high-quantity cocaine offense with sophisticated concealment. The trial court excluded the third party’s later arrest under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, finding the time gap and attenuated connection created only marginal probative value while inviting juror confusion and a distracting “mini-trial” about the unrelated arrest. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding alternative-perpetrator evidence must have a sufficiently direct nexus to the charged event; thematic similarity and a loose association to the vehicle were not enough. The court further held the exclusion did not violate the constitutional right to present a complete defense because standard evidentiary limits, applied neutrally, may bar speculative third-party culpability theories.
Litigation Takeaway
““Someone else did it” evidence is admissible only if you can show a concrete, case-specific connection to the incident at issue. Remote-in-time arrests or similar bad acts of a third person—without direct nexus (access, control, presence, digital/financial connectors, etc.)—are prime candidates for exclusion under Rule 403 as confusing, time-consuming, and minimally probative, and their exclusion generally will not amount to a constitutional denial of a defense.”
Christopher Peoples v. The State of Texas
COA12
In a robbery‑based capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly refused a self‑defense jury instruction on capital murder alleged under Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2) while allowing self‑defense on the lesser‑included offense of murder, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting text‑message chains over authenticity and “best evidence” objections. The State alleged Christopher Peoples killed the victim while in the course of committing/attempting robbery; Peoples admitted the killing but claimed self‑defense and the defense sought a self‑defense instruction on the capital charge. The court reasoned that, under Texas precedent and Penal Code § 9.31(b)(4), a robber has no right of self‑defense against the intended victim, so submitting self‑defense on the robbery‑capital theory would misstate the law; the jury could still consider self‑defense only if it rejected the robbery predicate and reached the murder lesser. On the evidentiary issue, the court applied Texas Rules of Evidence 901 and 1001–1002, emphasizing Rule 901’s low “support a finding” authentication threshold and that ESI “originals” include any accurate printout/output readable by sight. Missing or unrecoverable attachments in a forensic extraction did not make the message threads inadmissible; that limitation went to weight, not admissibility, so long as the proponent sufficiently linked the messages to the sender and showed the exhibit accurately reflected what was extracted.
Litigation Takeaway
“For Texas family‑law trials, *Peoples* is a practical blueprint for getting texts admitted (or keeping them out). Missing attachments or an imperfect extraction usually won’t defeat admissibility if you can authenticate the messages with circumstantial “linking” facts and lay that the exhibit accurately reflects the recovered data; argue gaps go to weight, not admissibility. If opposing, focus objections on weak authorship linkage and whether the proffered output reliably/accurately reflects the source (and consider Rule 403 for misleading excerpts), not merely that the thread is incomplete.”
Daniel Kenneth Meek v. The State of Texas
COA09
In a family-violence assault prosecution, the State and its witnesses repeatedly referred to the complainant (and domestic violence complainants generally) as the “victim.” Defense counsel objected once—arguing the person was only a “complaining witness” because it had not been established she was a victim—but did not clearly invoke due process/presumption-of-innocence grounds and did not object again as the terminology continued throughout trial. On appeal, the defendant reframed the complaint as a constitutional due-process/fair-trial violation. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the issue as an error-preservation question under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and the Marin/Clark/Broxton line of cases, explaining that even constitutional fair-trial complaints are generally forfeitable and must be preserved by timely, specific objections that comport with the theory urged on appeal, and renewed when the complained-of matter recurs (Fuentes). Because the single trial objection was not sufficiently specific/constitutional and was not renewed with each later use of “victim,” the court held the complaint was forfeited and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If opposing counsel or witnesses repeatedly label someone a “victim” before any finding of wrongdoing, you must preserve the issue with precision: object early, state the exact legal basis you intend to raise (due process/presumption of innocence, improper bolstering/opinion, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, etc.), get a ruling, and either secure a clear running objection or object each time the term is used. One vague objection will not preserve a later constitutional appellate complaint.”
Melvin Orlando Guevara Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this capital murder appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant's self-serving statements during a police interview were admissible under hearsay exceptions. The defendant, who killed a man after breaking into a home to confront an ex-girlfriend, attempted to introduce his own custodial statements—claiming he was intoxicated, remorseful, and didn't mean to hurt anyone—under the 'excited utterance' and 'mental state' exceptions. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that these statements were inadmissible hearsay. The court also ruled that defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine a key witness could be a valid trial strategy and that a lesser-included offense instruction was not required because there was no evidence the defendant was guilty only of murder rather than capital murder.
Litigation Takeaway
“You generally cannot use your own out-of-court statements (like police interviews or body-cam footage) to prove your innocence or 'state of mind' in court; to get your side of the story into evidence, you must typically testify live and face cross-examination.”
In the Matter of X.M., a Juvenile
COA12
In a Texas juvenile determinate-sentence case, X.M. attempted to appeal a December 2, 2019 adjudication and disposition order committing the juvenile to TJJD by filing a pro se notice of appeal on February 24, 2026—more than six years late. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed the mandatory appellate timetables under TRAP 26.1 (deadline to file notice of appeal) and TRAP 26.3 (15-day grace period requiring both a notice of appeal and a timely motion for extension). Because neither a timely notice nor a timely extension request was filed within the rule-based windows, the court concluded it lacked jurisdiction. The court also rejected any request to “fix” the problem by suspending the rules, holding TRAP 2 cannot be used to alter the time to perfect an appeal in a civil case. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction under TRAP 42.3(a) and overruled pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines are jurisdictional: if you miss the TRAP 26.1 notice-of-appeal deadline (and the narrow TRAP 26.3 grace period), the court of appeals cannot reach the merits—no matter how compelling the circumstances. In family-law cases with accelerated timetables, calendar the signing date immediately, file the notice early when in doubt, and do a “jurisdiction audit” before evaluating appellate issues.”
In re Miranda Fredenberg
COA12
In a SAPCR modification case, the mother sought mandamus/prohibition arguing a retired visiting judge lost authority to act once the trial court’s plenary power expired because the assignment order carried forward only “until plenary power has expired.” After the modification order was signed, the visiting judge signed an income withholding order (IWO) after plenary power expired and scheduled/reset hearings on other post‑judgment motions. The Tyler Court of Appeals applied the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy) and analyzed (1) the distinction between plenary power over the merits and the court’s continuing enforcement jurisdiction, and (2) the scope of the visiting judge’s assignment. The court held the post‑plenary IWO was not void because it functioned as an enforcement tool contemplated by the modification order and authorized by Texas Family Code § 158.102, which allows withholding to issue until support/arrearages are paid. As to other post‑judgment matters, the record did not show the visiting judge ruled on them outside his authority before the presiding administrative judge issued an amended assignment expressly granting authority to handle post‑judgment proceedings going forward. Mandamus and prohibition were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Plenary power expiring does not necessarily end a court’s ability to issue support-enforcement instruments like an income withholding order—especially when the final SAPCR order anticipates withholding and the Family Code authorizes it. If you plan to attack a visiting judge’s post‑judgment authority, you must build a precise record of what was signed and when, and move quickly because an amended assignment can prospectively cure assignment-scope problems.”
In the Interest of M.Z. and M.C.Z., Children
COA05
In a Dallas County divorce after a 23-year marriage, the community estate included the husband’s executive deferred-compensation “performance units,” which would pay only upon future contingent events (e.g., IPO, dividend, sale) and could be forfeited. The only valuation evidence was uncontroverted expert CPA testimony that the units had no presently ascertainable fair market value as of trial, but were not worthless and could be divided in kind. The trial court nevertheless treated the units as 100% community property, awarded 100% of them to the husband, and assigned a $0 value in the just-and-right division. Applying the abuse-of-discretion framework with embedded legal-sufficiency review under Texas Family Code § 7.001, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that evidence showing “no current calculable FMV” does not support a finding of “no value,” and the record contained no affirmative evidence that the units were worthless. Because the performance units were a material portion of the community estate, the erroneous $0 valuation tainted the overall division. The court reversed the property division and remanded for a new, proper division of the community estate (affirming the divorce otherwise).
Litigation Takeaway
“Contingent does not mean worthless. If an asset can’t be reliably valued today (executive compensation, earnouts, carried interests, options), a court cannot simply assign $0 without evidence of actual worthlessness—especially if it awards the entire asset to one spouse. Build a record that either (1) proves worthlessness, or (2) supports a division-in-kind or other non-speculative mechanism, and tie any valuation error to overall “just and right” harm when the asset is material.”
In the Interest of C.R., a Child
COA04
In a Guadalupe County divorce, the mother alleged a history or pattern of family violence/abuse/neglect and sought to be appointed sole managing conservator with the father denied possession and access (or, alternatively, supervised access). A jury trial on conservatorship resulted in findings (under a preponderance standard in the charge) that the mother should be sole managing conservator and that the father should not be appointed a possessory conservator. At the charge conference, the father affirmatively stated he had “no objections.” The trial court then rendered a decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and denying the father any possession or access, with findings that access would endanger the child and was not in the child’s best interest. On appeal, the father argued the preponderance instruction was unconstitutional because a no-access decree is “tantamount to termination” and should require clear-and-convincing evidence, and also contended the submission improperly asked the jury to decide an impermissible “term or condition” of possession/access under Tex. Fam. Code § 105.002(c)(2)(B). The Fourth Court treated both arguments as unpreserved jury-charge complaints: by stating “no objections,” the father waived charge error, and the court declined to apply fundamental-error review, noting that even in actual termination cases the Supreme Court requires preservation and that conservatorship orders—unlike termination—remain modifiable (distinguishing cases like *Stary* tied to protective orders). The court further concluded the jury was asked to decide conservatorship status (permissible), and because the jury refused to place the father in any conservatorship role, the trial court properly denied possession and access as a consequence of that status determination. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a conservatorship submission sets up a potential “no access” outcome, you must preserve error at the charge conference—object to the burden of proof and the form of the questions and obtain rulings. Saying “no objections” will almost certainly waive appellate review, and courts will not rescue the issue by rebranding it as fundamental error or “de facto termination.””
In the Interest of E.D.A., Child
COA04
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination case, Mother challenged only the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and the legal/factual sufficiency framework, applying the Holley factors and the statutory permanency and safety considerations in § 263.307. The court emphasized Mother’s admitted heroin relapse, her refusal to submit to any of eighteen requested drug tests (supporting an inference of continued use), her failure to complete key service-plan requirements (assessment/treatment, counseling, parenting class), and her pattern of missed visits as evidence of present and future danger and diminished parental ability. Against that risk evidence, the court credited proof of the child’s stability, bonding, and needs being met in an adoptive foster placement, including testimony about the child’s dysregulation after visits and the foster parents’ structured support. The court held the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won on a cohesive narrative: relapse plus refusal to test and failure to engage services can be powerful, forward-looking danger evidence—especially when contrasted with a child’s stability and bonding in the proposed placement. If you represent the accusing party, document test requests and noncompliance and pair it with concrete stability evidence; if you defend the parent, avoid a “refusal/disengagement” record by testing, completing treatment-focused services early, and documenting consistent visitation and objective sobriety.”
In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children
COA04
In a Department-initiated termination suit, both parents challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and termination sufficiency frameworks (legal sufficiency: view evidence favorably to the finding and defer to credibility determinations; factual sufficiency: consider the whole record and whether disputed evidence is so significant that a firm belief could not be formed). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support predicate grounds—especially endangerment and continued controlled-substance use coupled with refusal/failure to complete treatment—based on Mother’s admissions of frequent methamphetamine and marijuana use, physical evidence of methamphetamine, and an extensive drug-test history (33 positives out of 36 requests, including shortly before trial), along with service-plan noncompliance and untreated mental-health concerns. As to Father, the court affirmed termination and rejected his best-interest challenge, emphasizing his refusal to drug test and meaningfully engage in services, unmanaged mental-health issues (including self-medicating with street-obtained pills), unstable housing/employment, and the children’s trauma responses tied to domestic-violence risk factors. Weighing the chronic, unresolved risk factors against the children’s stability and progress in the maternal grandmother’s home and her intent to adopt, the court upheld the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination (and high-stakes custody) cases are won on patterns, not episodes: repeated positive/missed drug tests, refusal or discharge from treatment, unmanaged mental health, and ongoing domestic-violence risk factors can establish endangerment and drive the best-interest analysis. Document the services offered and the parent’s noncompliance, and contrast ongoing instability with the child’s progress and permanency in a stable placement—late, last-minute re-engagement is often too little, too late.”
In the Interest of T.S., a Child
COA05
In a SAPCR appeal from the 301st District Court (Dallas County), the appellant filed an opening brief that violated Texas appellate privacy/redaction requirements (Tex. R. App. P. 9.9) and the required contents/organization of an appellant’s brief (Tex. R. App. P. 38.1). The Dallas Court of Appeals struck the noncompliant brief, ordered the appellant to file an amended, rule-compliant brief by a firm deadline, and expressly warned the appeal would be dismissed without further notice if the appellant did not comply. The appellant neither rebriefed nor contacted the court. Treating the silence as failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a court order, the court dismissed the appeal under Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1) and 42.3(b), (c).
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, the merits won’t be reached if you don’t follow the rules. A brief that violates privacy/redaction (TRAP 9.9) or briefing requirements (TRAP 38.1) can be struck; if you then miss a rebriefing deadline and stay silent, the court can—and likely will—dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. Calendar rebriefing deadlines immediately, cure every defect, and if you need more time, file an extension motion before the deadline.”
Chase Allen Curtis v. Gabrielle Analisa Laplante
COA04
In a bifurcated divorce proceeding, the trial court found an informal marriage existed between Curtis and Laplante beginning in January 2014 under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), then entered a divorce decree and divided property as community. On appeal, Curtis challenged the sufficiency of the informal-marriage finding. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied § 2.401(a)(2), which requires proof that the parties (1) agreed to be married, and after that agreement (2) lived together in Texas as spouses and (3) represented to others in Texas that they were married—concurrently. The court emphasized that the “agreement” element requires a present, mutual decision to be married, not merely engagement or plans for a future ceremony, and that occasional “husband/wife” references do not, by themselves, establish a present agreement. Reviewing the evidence against the specific date found (January 2014), the court held the proof was factually insufficient to establish the required concurrence of the statutory elements as of that time. Because the divorce decree and property division depended on the existence of a marriage, the court reversed and remanded. The court also held the absence of additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was not reversible because it did not prevent Curtis from presenting his sufficiency challenge; any inconsistency between the decree and findings was resolved under Rule 299a by giving controlling effect to the findings for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
“Informal marriage is a make-or-break issue: the proponent must prove a present, mutual agreement to be married plus Texas cohabitation and Texas holding out, all occurring together on a defensible inception date—not just a long relationship, engagement, or sporadic “husband/wife” talk. Build (or attack) the case with date-specific, corroborated evidence (documents and third-party testimony), because factual-sufficiency review can overturn an informal-marriage finding and collapse the divorce/property-division framework.”
In the Interest of I.R.R., a Child
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default SAPCR, Father argued the judgment was void for defective service and, alternatively, unsupported by evidence. The Dallas Court of Appeals first examined the face of the record for strict compliance with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 106 and 107 and held the return of service adequately identified Father and what was served; Rule 107 did not require the served petition/exhibits to be attached to the return in the clerk’s file, so the trial court had personal jurisdiction. The court then reviewed the default prove-up evidence and concluded it was legally insufficient to establish Father’s net resources, making both the guideline-based current support order and the retroactive support judgment unsustainable. Finally, the court held the record was factually insufficient to overcome the Family Code presumption that joint managing conservatorship is in the child’s best interest; the prove-up lacked substantive best-interest evidence justifying Mother as sole managing conservator with Father as possessory conservator. The court reversed the SAPCR order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even in a default SAPCR with airtight service, you still must build a real evidentiary record: prove net resources (and show the guideline math) for current and retroactive support, and present concrete best-interest facts to rebut the joint-managing presumption if seeking a sole-managing conservatorship. For respondents, restricted appeals often succeed on sufficiency problems in thin prove-ups rather than on service defects.”
In re I.M.
COA03
In an original proceeding arising from Travis County, the relator sought mandamus relief from the Third Court of Appeals but provided a petition and/or record that did not affirmatively establish the prerequisites for extraordinary relief. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and the traditional mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal), the court issued a one-sentence memorandum opinion denying relief because the relator failed to show entitlement to mandamus. The court’s summary disposition reflects strict enforcement of Rule 52’s briefing and record burdens and a refusal to reach the merits when the required elements are not demonstrated on the face of the petition and supporting record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is not a second appeal: win or lose depends on the front-end work. If you cannot prove (with a complete, authenticated Rule 52 record and element-by-element briefing) both a clear abuse of discretion and why ordinary appeal is inadequate, the court may deny mandamus summarily—without addressing the underlying dispute.”
In re Modesto E. Garza
COA04
In a pending Bexar County SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus relief and emergency temporary relief from the Fourth Court of Appeals. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a), the court held the relator failed to carry the Rule 52 burden to affirmatively establish entitlement to the extraordinary remedy—i.e., the petition and mandamus record did not sufficiently demonstrate a right to relief. Because mandamus was denied, the requested emergency temporary relief was denied as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in SAPCR cases is record-driven: the court of appeals will not reach the equities or treat custody disputes as self-proving emergencies. Build a Rule 52-compliant petition and mandamus record (signed order/ruling, key pleadings, transcripts, and authenticated exhibits) and clearly show both an abuse of discretion and why there is no adequate appellate remedy—or expect a swift denial and any emergency relief request to become moot.”
In the Interest of Q.G., C.G., Z.G. and A.I.G., Children
COA05
In an appeal involving the interests of multiple children, the appellant failed to participate in key post-notice appellate steps: the appellant did not respond to the court’s inquiry about the reporter’s record and did not file an appellate brief. The Fifth Court of Appeals ordered the case submitted without a reporter’s record and set a firm briefing deadline. After the deadline passed, the court issued a delinquency notice giving a ten-day cure period and expressly warning that the appeal would be dismissed without further notice if no brief was filed. When the appellant still filed nothing and made no contact with the court, the court applied the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing want of prosecution and noncompliance and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Child-related appeals can be lost on procedure: if you don’t secure the record, respond to court inquiries, and file your brief by the ordered deadline (or timely seek an extension), the court can—and will—dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution even after a single delinquency warning.”
In the Interest of T.C.C. and B.D.C., Children
COA05
After a bench trial, the judge orally rendered that Father would pay guideline child support based on minimum-wage net resources and reimburse Mother for the children’s portion of health-insurance premiums. The written final divorce decree signed shortly after trial contained lower child-support numbers and omitted any reimbursement obligation. Months later—after the trial court’s plenary power expired—Mother moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct the decree to match the oral rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the dispute as a clerical “rendition-versus-entry” problem: because the reporter’s record showed the court had already rendered guideline child support on minimum-wage earnings and ordered premium reimbursement, the later written decree’s inconsistent numbers and omission were clerical mistakes in memorializing the judgment, not a new judicial decision. The court held the trial court could correct those clerical errors by nunc pro tunc at any time, and it affirmed the corrected child-support amounts and added medical-support reimbursement term. The court also dismissed Father’s challenges to unrelated provisions (protective order, conservatorship, homestead sale) for lack of jurisdiction because an appeal from a nunc pro tunc judgment reaches only the nunc pro tunc corrections, not issues that could have been appealed from the original decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the signed decree doesn’t match what the judge said on the record, a nunc pro tunc can fix true clerical discrepancies—even after plenary power expires—but it cannot be used to make new judicial changes. Also, appealing a nunc pro tunc order does not reopen the whole divorce; appellate review is limited to the corrections actually made, so missing the original appeal deadline can be fatal to other complaints.”
In re E.R.F.
COA04
In a parentage action, the alleged father nonsuited his petition and the trial court signed an order granting the nonsuit. Because the mother had not filed any counterclaim or other pleading seeking affirmative relief at the time of the nonsuit, the nonsuit extinguished the case. Under Rule 329b, the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction expired 30 days after the signed nonsuit order. The mother later filed a motion for temporary orders and the trial court held a hearing and orally announced temporary possession-and-access rulings, later reducing them to a written temporary order. The Fourth Court of Appeals held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue any substantive temporary possession/access orders after plenary power expired; both the oral pronouncements and the later written temporary orders were void. The court granted mandamus relief and ordered the void temporary orders set aside.
Litigation Takeaway
“A nonsuit is a hard jurisdictional stop: if the opposing party has not already filed a live claim for affirmative relief, the case is over and the court cannot issue post-dismissal temporary custody/possession orders once plenary power runs. To preserve (or obtain) temporary relief, get an affirmative counterclaim on file before the nonsuit—or file a new SAPCR/parentage case. Void post-plenary orders are immediately mandamusable without proving an inadequate appellate remedy.”
In the Interest of J.E.H., a Child
COA07
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination suit involving a fifteen-year-old, Mother appealed only the trial court’s best-interest finding. The Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, noting that unchallenged predicate findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) (endangering conditions/endangerment/constructive abandonment) were binding on appeal and could be considered as best-interest evidence. The record showed Mother provided unsafe and unstable housing with inconsistent utilities and unsanitary conditions, failed to ensure the child’s medical and educational needs were met, had minimal visitation and support during the year-long case, and did not complete key service-plan requirements (including parenting classes and counseling). By contrast, the child was thriving in a stable placement, expressed discomfort with visits, and wanted to remain with the caregiver. Rejecting Mother’s argument that termination punished poverty/disability, the court focused on concrete safety and caregiving deficiencies and affirmed that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won with specific, child-centered proof of safety, stability, and follow-through over time—not generalized hardship arguments. Service-plan noncompliance, minimal contact/support, and unsafe or unstable housing can carry the best-interest finding, especially when contrasted with a child’s documented progress and stated preference for a stable placement; and on appeal, unchallenged predicate grounds will be treated as established and can powerfully support best interest.”
In the Interest of B.D.R., a Child
COA05
In a child-related appeal from the 301st District Court (Dallas County), the appellant’s brief became overdue. The Fifth Court of Appeals sent a delinquency notice directing the appellant to file a brief within ten days and expressly warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(a)(1). The appellant neither filed a brief nor sought an extension or otherwise communicated with the court. Applying TRAP 38.8(a)(1) and its independent dismissal authority under TRAP 42.3(b) (want of prosecution) and 42.3(c) (failure to comply with a rule/court notice), the court treated the appeal as abandoned and dismissed it, leaving the trial court’s child-related orders in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, missed briefing deadlines can end the case. If your brief is late, act immediately—file the brief and/or a motion for extension with a reasonable explanation before the court’s cure deadline. Silence after a Rule 38.8 delinquency notice is a fast path to dismissal for want of prosecution, even in child-interest cases.”
Hirut Assefa Desta v. Abraham Ayalew Wassihun
COA14
In a Fort Bend County divorce, the husband took a default final decree after the pro se wife never filed a formal answer but had sent an email to court staff (addressed to the district clerk, identifying the case and her status as respondent, requesting more time before any default, and providing contact information). About a year later the husband proceeded to a prove-up/final trial without giving her notice; the court signed a default decree with significant property consequences. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court held the wife’s email was an “appearance”/informal answer under Texas law, even though it was not file-stamped or included in the clerk’s record, because it was tendered into the court’s administrative channels and objectively showed intent to participate. Once a respondent has appeared, due process and Texas default-judgment law require notice of the dispositive setting; because the husband obtained the default decree without notice to an appearing party, the decree violated due process and the trial court abused its discretion by letting it stand. The court also held appellate deadlines were preserved via Rule 306a based on the wife’s late notice of the judgment. The default divorce decree was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
““Default-ready” means more than “no answer on file.” Any informal written communication by a pro se spouse that identifies the case and shows intent to participate (emails to coordinators/clerks, letters, faxes) can constitute an appearance and trigger mandatory notice of the final/prove-up setting. If you take a default without provable notice after such an appearance, the decree is vulnerable to reversal for a due-process violation—often without having to satisfy the full Craddock new-trial showing.”
In re Samuel Oyewole
COA01
In a Harris County divorce case, the husband sought mandamus relief after (1) the trial court’s docket sheet showed the March 2, 2026 trial setting was reset to May 18, 2026 following his eve-of-trial recusal motion, and (2) the regional presiding judge denied his third motion to recuse the trial judge. Applying the mandamus standard (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy), the First Court of Appeals refused to use mandamus to second-guess routine docket control reflected only in a docket-sheet entry and further held the mandamus record did not demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion in the regional presiding judge’s recusal denial. The court therefore denied mandamus and left both the May 18 trial setting and the recusal denial intact.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is an exceptional remedy—not a scheduling weapon. Trial resets (especially those shown only by docket entries) are usually treated as ordinary docket management, and recusal denials—particularly after referral to the regional presiding judge and in the context of serial recusal motions—are hard to overturn without a complete, evidence-supported record showing legally cognizable bias and irreparable harm.”
Andrew Thomas Vidal v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a continuous child sexual abuse prosecution, the defendant argued on appeal that a visiting judge’s voir dire comments about the difficulty and prevalence of child-sex-abuse cases improperly “set an unfavorable tone,” conveyed an opinion of guilt in violation of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.05, and undermined due process and the presumption of innocence—despite no trial objection. The El Paso Court of Appeals reviewed the remarks in context and treated them as permissible “process” comments aimed at screening jurors for suitability in an emotionally charged case, emphasizing that the judge repeatedly redirected the panel to the presumption of innocence. The court held the comments did not communicate that the judge believed the State’s evidence, disbelieved the defense, or had predetermined the outcome. And even assuming the remarks approached the line, the appellant failed to demonstrate reversible harm. The court affirmed the conviction and concurrent sentences.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-allegation trials (including SAPCRs and protective-order cases), appellate courts distinguish between neutral, case-management/voir dire comments acknowledging difficult subject matter and improper comments that signal credibility or merits. If a judge’s remarks start drifting from “process” to “proof,” object and build a harm record immediately (request curative instructions, get rulings, and tie the comment to concrete prejudice); without a specific harm narrative, “tone-setting” complaints rarely win on appeal.”
In the Interest of Z.P., a Child
COA05
In a child-support enforcement action, the mother sought confirmation of arrears and a cumulative money judgment “plus interest,” along with attorney’s fees. Before the enforcement hearing, the father paid the arrearage principal ($25,420) through the OAG, and the trial court confirmed the arrears as paid and awarded $8,766.65 in attorney’s fees/costs but omitted any interest from the cumulative money judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 157.263 makes interest on confirmed child-support arrearages mandatory when a money judgment is requested; the trial court’s role is essentially mechanical once arrears are confirmed, and a pretrial payment of principal does not eliminate accrued statutory interest. The court reversed and remanded for the limited purpose of adding interest on the previously accrued $25,420 arrearage amount, while affirming the reduced attorney’s-fee award because reasonableness remains a fact issue within the trial court’s discretion even when the fee evidence is uncontroverted.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas child-support enforcement, don’t let a last-minute payment of arrears principal lull you into thinking the case is over—if you plead for a money judgment, interest under Family Code § 157.263 is mandatory and an order that omits it is reversible. Also, even strong, uncontroverted fee proof doesn’t guarantee the full amount requested; position “reasonableness” and tie the work to enforcement necessity if you want the court to award all fees.”
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In an original proceeding arising from a Dallas County family case, the relator sought mandamus relief to force the trial court to vacate its refusal to hold a hearing on a renewed plea to the jurisdiction. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the request under the two-part mandamus standard from In re Prudential—requiring a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal—and concluded the relator’s mandamus record and briefing did not meet that burden. Without reaching the merits of the underlying jurisdictional challenge, the court denied mandamus under TRAP 52.8(a) and, because mandamus was denied, also denied as moot the relator’s request to compel preparation and filing of an omitted reporter’s record from a March 5, 2026 hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is not automatic just because the dispute is framed as “jurisdictional.” If you want emergency appellate relief to force a trial court to hear (or re-hear) a jurisdictional plea, you must build a mandamus-ready record proving the court clearly abused its discretion and explaining—case specifically—why a normal appeal is inadequate under Prudential; otherwise, the appellate court may deny relief without ever addressing whether jurisdiction is actually lacking.”
In re Praveen Venkateswara Pinnamaneni
COA01
In an original habeas corpus proceeding arising from a Harris County divorce case, the relator sought release from a civil contempt commitment order jailing him for six violations of agreed temporary orders requiring spousal support payments. The First Court of Appeals emphasized that habeas relief from a contempt confinement is available only when the relator affirmatively shows the commitment is void or the confinement otherwise unlawful, and the relator bears the burden to supply a record demonstrating that defect. Even though no respondent filed a response and the court had temporarily released the relator on a $500 bond while it reviewed the petition, the court concluded the relator did not carry his burden to show any jurisdictional, due-process, specificity, or other facial defect rendering the contempt/commitment order void. The court therefore denied habeas relief, lifted the temporary bond-release order, and dismissed pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Contempt habeas is narrow and record-driven: to get a client out of jail, you must bring a complete record showing a facial/jurisdictional or due-process defect that makes the commitment order void; a temporary bond release or the other side’s nonresponse will not win the case for you.”
Butler v. Taylor
COA01
In a bench-tried divorce, the husband appealed complaining the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and challenging the decree’s property division (including a townhome), conservatorship/possession provisions, and child-support ruling. The First Court of Appeals held the husband waived any complaint about missing findings because, although he timely requested findings under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296, he did not timely file a Rule 297 notice of past-due findings. Without findings, the appellate court implied all facts necessary to support the judgment and reviewed the decree under the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Applying inception of title, the court concluded the record supported treating the Yorktown Meadow Lane townhome as the wife’s separate property because she acquired it before marriage; the husband’s testimony that he paid down the mortgage did not change characterization and did not establish a separate-property reimbursement/tracing claim (and the trial court could credit testimony that the payoff was intended as a gift). The court also rejected the husband’s conservatorship/possession and child-support complaints, noting broad trial-court discretion and that portions of the husband’s briefing were inadequately developed and thus waived. The divorce decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a Texas bench-tried divorce, calendar Rule 296/297 deadlines with zero slack: a late Rule 297 past-due notice waives the right to findings and forces the appeal into implied-findings territory, where the court will presume facts supporting the decree. Also, property-characterization and reimbursement claims live or die on proof—deeds for inception of title, tracing documents for the source of funds, and clear evidence on gift vs. reimbursement intent—because abuse-of-discretion review plus implied findings makes reversal unlikely.”
In the Interest of A.C. and N.C., Children
COA07
In a Texas parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appellate counsel moved to withdraw after briefing was complete, citing a new employment-based, “irreconcilable” conflict. Because termination appeals are accelerated and parents have a protected right to counsel, the Seventh Court of Appeals declined to proceed on an unclear record regarding counsel’s conflict and the parent’s continued representation. The court abated the appeal and remanded to the trial court to (1) rule on the withdrawal motion, (2) determine whether replacement appellate counsel must be appointed, and (3) create an appellate-ready supplemental record—including findings of fact and conclusions of law and any reporter’s record of the hearing—by a firm, expedited deadline (March 31, 2026).
Litigation Takeaway
“In accelerated family-law appeals (especially termination), a withdrawal or conflict motion is not “paperwork”—it can stop the appeal. Get a prompt trial-court ruling, make a record (hearing + reporter), and secure written findings and a supplemental clerk’s record quickly, or the court of appeals will abate and impose strict deadlines that can compress briefing and jeopardize client rights.”
Osbaldo Gonzales v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a single-count aggravated sexual assault of a child case alleging digital penetration, the child and outcry witness testified the act happened “twice.” The defendant argued this created a material variance from the one-count indictment and raised double-jeopardy concerns because it was unclear which incident supported the conviction. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the variance framing, holding the proof matched the indictment’s elements (digital penetration) and the record did not clearly establish two distinct criminal episodes (the “twice” testimony could describe multiple penetrations within one encounter). The court explained that if the evidence could be read as multiple discrete acts, the proper doctrine is jury unanimity/state election—not variance—and that complaint must be preserved by requesting an election or a specific unanimity instruction. Because the defense requested neither, any election/unanimity complaint was waived. The court also noted that when no election is made and multiple incidents are tried under one count, double jeopardy can bar later prosecution of either incident placed in evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a child’s testimony suggests “more than once” conduct under a single-count sexual-assault indictment, don’t mislabel it as a “variance” argument. If you need the State pinned to one episode, you must timely demand an election or a tailored unanimity instruction; otherwise the issue is waived on appeal. Strategically, declining to force election may actually expand double-jeopardy protection and prevent later charges based on other incidents mentioned at trial—an important consideration in parallel family-law cases that rely on criminal-case records.”
Townsen Memorial Hospital, Southeast Texas Medical Ventures LLC d/b/a Townsen Memorial Hospital, and Markus Baloney, RN v. Cedric Wheeler
COA01
In a Texas health-care-liability suit arising from post-operative spinal-surgery complications, the plaintiff served a Chapter 74 expert report from a board-certified neurosurgeon who criticized the hospital’s nursing care (monitoring, documentation, recognition of cauda equina red flags, and escalation/communication). The hospital challenged the physician’s qualifications to opine on nursing standards and argued the report was insufficient on standard of care, breach, and causation; the trial court allowed a cure and then overruled the objections. After a nurse was added as a defendant, he was served with the amended report but did not object within the statutory 21-day window; about 18 months later he sought dismissal by labeling the report “no report” as to him because it did not name him specifically. The First Court of Appeals applied the Chapter 74 “threshold screening” and abuse-of-discretion framework and, within the report’s four corners, held the trial court could reasonably find the neurosurgeon qualified because his training and experience showed familiarity with the same type of postoperative spinal/neurologic monitoring and escalation issues at the heart of the nursing allegations. The court also held the amended report was a good-faith effort that adequately summarized the nursing standard of care, alleged breaches, and a causal pathway sufficient for early-stage Chapter 74 purposes. Finally, the court treated the later-added nurse’s “no report” theory as a timeliness/waiver problem: because he was served and failed to object within 21 days, the late dismissal attack was waived. The denial of dismissal was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Expert fights are won (or lost) on two points: (1) qualifications turn on whether the expert has concrete experience with the same type of task/analysis at issue—not just whether the expert shares the opponent’s job title; and (2) timing is everything—if you don’t challenge an expert promptly under the governing deadline, courts are likely to find waiver even if you repackage the argument as “this isn’t an expert opinion at all.””
Rhonda Williams v. Javier Alessandro Madrid Urquia and Jhonny Javier Madrid Urquia
COA14
In this case, plaintiffs sued the City of Houston and its employee, Rhonda Williams, after a motor vehicle collision. After nonsuiting that initial case, the plaintiffs filed a second suit against Williams individually. Williams moved for summary judgment, arguing that under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106(a), the initial suit against the City constituted an irrevocable election of remedies that barred any future claims against her individually. The trial court denied the motion, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court analyzed the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), concluding that the act of filing suit against a governmental unit immediately and permanently bars claims against the employee regarding the same subject matter, and a subsequent nonsuit cannot 'reset' this election.
Litigation Takeaway
“Be extremely cautious when naming a governmental unit in a lawsuit; under the Texas Tort Claims Act, once you sue a city or county for an incident involving an employee, you are 'immediately and forever' barred from suing that employee individually. This election of remedies is irrevocable, meaning a nonsuit or an amendment to your pleadings cannot undo the bar and restore your ability to pursue the individual defendant.”
In re West Fork Group, LLC
COA14
A trial court orally granted a motion for new trial and recorded the decision in a docket entry within the required timeframe, but it failed to sign a written order until after its 'plenary power' (jurisdictional authority) had expired. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b, a motion for new trial is overruled by operation of law if a written order is not signed within 75 days of the judgment, and the court’s power to act ends 30 days after that. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Supreme Court precedent and held that oral pronouncements and docket entries cannot substitute for a signed written order. Because the written order was signed after the 105-day deadline, it was void, and the court granted mandamus relief to vacate all orders entered after the deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas litigation, a judge's oral ruling 'from the bench' is not legally binding for the purpose of extending court deadlines—only a signed, written order counts. If you are seeking a new trial, you must ensure the judge signs the written order before the 75-day 'operation of law' deadline; otherwise, you hit a jurisdictional cliff that can render all subsequent wins void and reinstate the original judgment.”
Members Choice Credit Union v. Juan Menjivar
COA14
Members Choice Credit Union (MCCU) sued Juan Menjivar for a deficiency balance following a vehicle repossession. Before trial, the court excluded MCCU's business records because they were not served 14 days in advance as required for self-authentication under Rule 902(10). Despite presenting a witness at trial, MCCU failed to re-offer the documents or make an 'offer of proof' on the record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's take-nothing judgment, holding that without a reporter’s record or a formal bill of exception showing what the excluded evidence was, the appellate court must presume the trial court’s ruling was correct.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning on appeal requires more than just being right; it requires a complete record. If a judge excludes critical evidence like bank statements or medical records, you must immediately make an 'offer of proof' on the record or file a 'formal bill of exception.' Without these steps, the appellate court will assume the trial judge was right, even if the documents should have been admitted.”
Renove Medical Spa, PLLC & Afia Naqvi, M.D. v. Charlotte Elizondo
COA14
Charlotte Elizondo sued Renove Medical Spa and Dr. Afia Naqvi for negligence after a facial injection led to a life-threatening infection. Under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA), Elizondo served an expert report from a nurse practitioner. The defendants waited over a year to object, arguing the nurse was unqualified to opine on a doctor's standard of care and that the report was therefore legally nonexistent (a "no report" scenario). The court analyzed whether a report by an unqualified expert is a jurisdictional nullity or a "deficient" report subject to waiver. Applying Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court held that qualification challenges are sufficiency objections that must be raised within the TMLA’s 21-day statutory window. Because the defendants missed this deadline, they waived their challenge, and the denial of their motion to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas litigation, "unqualified" does not mean "nonexistent." If an opponent serves an expert report—whether in a medical malpractice case or a child custody dispute—any challenge to that expert's credentials must be made promptly. Failing to object within statutory or procedural deadlines (like the TMLA’s 21-day window) waives the objection, potentially allowing a "deficient" expert to remain the anchor of the case.”
Gary P. Joseph v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this criminal appeal with frequent spillover into Texas family-law cases alleging sexual abuse, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court improperly admitted evidence of alleged sexual assaults and sexualized conduct beyond the charged time period—including acts occurring after the complainant turned 18—and whether those evidentiary rulings required reversal of a conviction for the lesser-included offense of sexual assault of a child (age 14–17). The court applied a plain-text construction of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 and held that the statute’s “gateway” requirement turns on the offense being prosecuted (a qualifying sexual offense committed against a child under 17), not on the complainant’s age at the time of the extraneous acts. Because the prosecution alleged a qualifying Chapter 22 offense committed when the complainant was under 17, article 38.37, §1(b) permitted evidence of other acts against the same victim to show relevant matters, including the “previous and subsequent relationship” between the defendant and the child-victim, even if some acts occurred after the complainant reached adulthood. The court further concluded the challenged admission/exclusion rulings (including embedded Rule 403 unfair-prejudice arguments) did not amount to reversible error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and the jury’s lesser-included conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When sexual-abuse allegations involve a long-running pattern, courts may allow “relationship narrative” evidence that extends beyond the child’s minority—so an “they were over 18 then” objection, standing alone, is often weak. In family cases (SAPCR, modifications, protective orders), build or attack the case on relevance, specificity, corroboration (outcry chronology, travel/records), and prejudice/mini-trial concerns, and treat SANE/DNA-type proof as potentially decisive at early hearings unless met with competent expert analysis.”
Roy Jones, III v. Sheryl Harris
COA14
After a 1976 divorce decree provided that each spouse would receive half the equity upon sale of the marital home, the house was never sold and the ex-husband remained in possession for decades. After his death, his son claimed 100% ownership based on a recorded 1976 quitclaim deed purportedly signed by the ex-wife and, alternatively, adverse possession. The ex-wife filed a partition/title action in Brazoria County district court seeking to cancel the deed and confirm her undivided interest. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the suit was properly treated as a present title/partition dispute—not an impermissible modification or enforcement action confined to the divorce court’s continuing jurisdiction under Family Code Chapter 9—so the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. On the merits, the court affirmed the rejection of adverse possession because long-term exclusive possession and payment of expenses did not establish hostile repudiation against a co-owner, especially in light of evidence that the decedent continued to acknowledge the ex-wife’s ownership. The court also upheld the jury’s forgery finding and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting the decedent’s out-of-court ownership statements (and related probate inventory language) under applicable hearsay doctrines, and affirmed denial of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel.
Litigation Takeaway
“Decades after divorce, “zombie property” disputes may be litigated as partition/title cases in district court even when the property division originated in a divorce decree. And don’t assume possession equals ownership: to win adverse possession against an ex-spouse/co-tenant, you need clear, communicated repudiation—while the other side can defeat limitations with admissions (family statements, probate filings) showing continued recognition of shared ownership and can use those same facts to attack a late-produced deed as forged or unreliable.”
In re A.R.M.
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from a divorce and SAPCR, the relator sought mandamus to vacate various trial-court orders and requested an emergency stay. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief because the petition and record did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52: the petition omitted required sections and the Rule 52.3(j) certification, provided no meaningful citations to legal authority, and was supported by an appendix/record that was neither sworn nor certified. The court further held mandamus was improper because the relator asserted a final divorce decree had been signed and a direct appeal was pending, making appeal an adequate remedy for the decree and for interlocutory rulings that merged into the final judgment. Separately, the court struck the appendix and mandamus record for containing unredacted sensitive data about a minor in violation of TRAP 9.9 (authorized by TRAP 9.4(k)) and dismissed the stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus in Texas family cases is unforgiving: (1) strict TRAP 52 compliance is a threshold requirement—missing sections, lack of authority, or an unsworn/uncertified record can sink the case before the court reaches the merits; (2) if a final divorce/SAPCR judgment exists (or you allege finality), appeal is usually the adequate remedy and interlocutory complaints typically must be raised in that appeal; and (3) TRAP 9.9 redaction is mandatory—filing unredacted child identifiers can get your record struck and destroy your ability to obtain emergency relief.”
Blanca Concepcion Gutierrez-Morales v. Adrian Jesus G. Morales
COA08
After a mediated settlement in a Texas partition suit over a family home was reduced to a judgment requiring a $40,000 buyout, the appellant moved for new trial claiming “newly discovered evidence” (alleged incorrect ownership percentages based on adoption-related facts, an alleged attorney conflict from a separate probate matter, and newly learned information about the home’s condition supported by photos). The motion was overruled by operation of law, and the appellant appealed only the denial of the new-trial motion. The Eighth Court of Appeals treated preservation as the threshold issue under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(b), explaining that an operation-of-law denial preserves complaints only when the issue can be properly presented without taking evidence. Because a newly-discovered-evidence new-trial ground requires competent, admissible proof of the required elements (post-trial discovery, diligence, non-cumulative nature, and materiality/probable effect on the result), the movant must request and obtain a hearing and introduce evidence into the record. Attachments to the motion (e.g., a birth certificate, docket sheet, and photos) were not a substitute for evidence introduced at a hearing. With no hearing and no evidentiary presentation, the complaint was waived, leaving nothing for appellate review; the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your motion for new trial depends on facts outside the trial record (like “newly discovered evidence”), you must timely request and obtain a hearing and put competent, admissible evidence into the record. Letting the motion die by operation of law—especially with only unauthenticated attachments—waives the issue on appeal and can turn a potentially strong argument into a complete preservation loss.”
Vijayalakshmi Nadar v. Thinakar Nadar
COA05
In a post-divorce property-division enforcement fight, the ex-wife sought to compel delivery/transfer of property awarded to her in the 2017 decree (safe-deposit contents, stock, and compensation tied to a Mumbai flat), while the ex-husband countered that she had wrongfully remained in possession of the Plano residence awarded to him and sought reimbursement for payments he made on debt tied to a vehicle awarded to her. The trial court managed the matters together (hearing the enforcement the same day as a bill of review) under a previously agreed scheduling order and limited each side to one hour total; it denied all relief requested by the wife, held her delivery-type claims for the safe-deposit contents and stock time-barred, and awarded the husband money judgments for damages related to her continued occupancy of the residence and for vehicle-debt payments. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the wife failed to preserve any due-process/case-management complaint about consolidation or time limits, (2) the trial court did not err in applying limitations to the wife’s delayed enforcement requests for delivery/transfer relief, and (3) sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s discretionary enforcement remedies awarding the husband $195,000 for extended post-decree occupancy of the residence and $9,600 for vehicle-debt reimbursement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Post-divorce “enforcement” is time-sensitive and proof-driven: delay can bar your affirmative requests by limitations and simultaneously expose your client to large offsetting money judgments for ongoing noncompliance (like staying in a house the decree awarded to the other spouse). Preserve procedural objections (time limits/consolidation) with a timely objection, offer of proof, and ruling, and come to a short bench trial with clean, documented damages and payment histories.”
In re the Commitment of George Dewey Stark
COA05
In this civil-commitment case, George Dewey Stark appealed a judgment declaring him a sexually violent predator, arguing that existing Texas Supreme Court precedent effectively eliminated a required statutory element, thereby violating his due process rights. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the argument and determined it was a constitutional challenge to the law as applied. The court held that under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, even constitutional and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court to be preserved for appeal. Because Stark failed to object or raise this theory during the trial proceedings, the court found the issue waived and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Constitutional and due-process arguments are not "get out of jail free" cards for a failure to object at trial. To save an issue for appeal—even one involving fundamental rights—you must make a specific and timely objection in the trial court and obtain a ruling.”