Weekly Digest
March 28 – April 3, 2026
36 opinions this week
Harrell v. Brinson
COA01
In Harrell v. Brinson, an inmate repeatedly sued a former landlord over the same underlying 2004 salon lease/break‑in events that led to his 2005 criminal conviction, despite prior final adverse rulings (including summary judgment and an unsuccessful bill of review). In a new 2021 suit repackaged as fraud and conspiracy based on alleged false testimony and collusion with a prosecutor, the defendant moved under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 11 to have Harrell declared a vexatious litigant and to dismiss. Applying Chapter 11, the First Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion because the record supported the required findings: there was no reasonable probability Harrell would prevail and he was attempting to relitigate the same controversy against the same defendant after prior final determinations. The court also addressed appellate jurisdiction: an earlier appeal was premature because claims against another defendant remained, but a later severance created a final judgment in the severed cause, and Harrell’s notice of appeal was timely under the prisoner mailbox rule based on proof he delivered it to prison authorities within the deadline. The court affirmed the vexatious‑litigant order and the dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“Chapter 11 is a powerful early tool to stop serial, pro se “relabeling” lawsuits that try to re-fight issues already finally decided; build a record of prior final determinations and show the new pleading is the same dispute in disguise, and the court can impose vexatious‑litigant restrictions and dismiss with prejudice. Procedurally, if an order isn’t final because other parties/claims remain, severance can create an appealable final judgment—and when the opposing party is incarcerated, plan for the prisoner mailbox rule to affect filing deadlines.”
Graham Wilson Gilliam v. Diane Werlein Gilliam
COA01
After a trial court appointed a receiver in a Harris County family law dispute, the appellant challenged the order in the First Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the court paused (abated) the proceedings to allow the parties to attend mediation. Following a successful mediation where all issues were resolved, the appellant moved to dismiss the appeal. The court analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), which allows for voluntary dismissal upon the appellant's motion. The court held that because a settlement was reached, no live controversy remained; it subsequently reinstated the appeal, granted the dismissal, and disposed of all pending motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a receivership or other interlocutory order is used as strategic leverage in a divorce, reaching a global settlement during appellate mediation allows for a clean procedural exit. Parties should use Rule 42.1 to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which ensures the case is closed efficiently and prevents further unnecessary legal expenses.”
Geoffrey Quinn v. Kimberly A. Sergeant
COA01
After a trial court rendered a divorce judgment, the parties reached a settlement through mediation while an appeal was pending. The appellant requested that the appellate court set aside the trial court's original judgment and remand the case for the entry of a new judgment based on the Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA). The appellee argued for a simple dismissal of the appeal. Analyzing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the First Court of Appeals determined that it had the authority to vacate the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits to facilitate a settlement. The court held that setting aside the judgment and remanding for rendition was appropriate, ensuring that the parties would not be stuck with an outdated and enforceable decree that conflicted with their new agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
“When settling a case on appeal, parties should request that the appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment and remand for a new judgment under TRAP 42.1(a)(2)(B). Simply dismissing the appeal leaves the original judgment intact and enforceable, which can create significant legal friction if the settlement terms differ from the original court order.”
Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres
COA03
Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal.”
Oscar Antonio Rodriguez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the complainant had previously viewed pornography on a relative’s phone to support a fabrication theory. The State invoked former Texas Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield rule), and after a hearing outside the jury’s presence the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it did not fit any exception and did not show bias or motive to lie. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that pornography exposure, at most, provides an “alternative source of sexual knowledge,” which does not satisfy Rule 412’s motive/bias exception absent a logical nexus showing why the exposure would lead the complainant to falsely accuse this defendant. The court also held any constitutional “right to present a defense” complaint was waived because the defense did not expressly raise that constitutional ground in the trial court and obtain a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“Porn/sexual-content exposure is not automatically admissible to undermine a child-complainant; without a concrete, non-speculative link to a specific motive or bias to fabricate against the accused, it is simply an alternative-knowledge theory and can be excluded under rape-shield/Rule 403 principles. Also, if you intend to argue evidence is “constitutionally required” (due process/confrontation/right to present a defense), you must clearly assert that ground, make a full offer of proof, and obtain an express ruling—or the issue is waived on appeal.”
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge-assessed punishment. Before the punishment hearing, the trial judge discussed Howard’s punishment exposure, referenced prior plea positions, and suggested a post-verdict negotiation range. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence, stating it was “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and no one objected or filed a motion for new trial claiming coercion or vindictiveness. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a resentencing after retrial, so Howard had to prove actual judicial vindictiveness from the record. The judge’s forceful comments and settlement-range discussion—paired with repeated disclaimers and a sentence matching the announced agreement—did not establish retaliation for exercising the right to trial. The court also held that complaints that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary, or that the trial court had to conduct an on-the-record voluntariness inquiry, were waived because Howard raised neither a contemporaneous objection nor a post-judgment motion developing those issues.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a judge “pushes a number” after a merits ruling, appellate courts often treat it as hard bargaining unless the record proves retaliation—and you still must preserve coercion/vindictiveness complaints immediately. If you believe a post-ruling agreement (Rule 11, parenting plan, property blueprint) was coerced, object on the record and follow up with a motion for new trial/to set aside that specifically pleads involuntariness and identifies the coercive statements; otherwise, the issue will likely be deemed waived.”
Johnny Ined Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State introduced still photos from a CAC forensic interview and had a CAC supervisor (who observed but did not conduct the interview) testify—over hearsay objections—about what the child’s gestures in the photos “meant,” describing specific sexual acts and sensory details. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the “gesture interpretation” testimony was inadmissible hearsay, but analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) and held any error was harmless because substantially the same evidence came in elsewhere without objection, most importantly through the child’s own later testimony explaining the same photos and through CAC medical records admitted without objection. The court affirmed the conviction, but reversed and remanded the $570 “reimbursement fees” portion of court costs because the record did not necessarily support all subpoena/service-related fees as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning the objection isn’t enough—winning the harm analysis is. If you want appellate relief from CAC/forensic-interview “interpretation” testimony, you must also object (or otherwise prevent) the same substantive details from coming in through other witnesses or records; otherwise the error will likely be deemed harmless as cumulative. Conversely, to defend a ruling, build redundancy by getting the key facts admitted through at least one clean, admissible pathway. Also, scrutinize and challenge service/subpoena cost line-items that aren’t tied to proof the service was actually performed.”
Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.
Litigation Takeaway
“When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial.”
Brisby Ray Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brisby Ray Brown v. State, the defendant challenged his aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction, arguing the jury charge improperly allowed a non-unanimous verdict by submitting, in the disjunctive, two distinct aggravated-assault offenses: (1) aggravated assault predicated on bodily-injury assault and (2) aggravated assault predicated on threat-by-assault, tied to different alleged deadly weapons. Applying the two-step jury-charge framework, the First Court of Appeals assumed/recognized charge error under Landrian because those are separate statutory aggravated-assault crimes requiring jury unanimity as to which offense was committed. However, because Brown did not object on unanimity grounds, the court reviewed only for Almanza egregious harm, considering the entire charge (including a general unanimity instruction), the evidence, closing arguments, and the record as a whole. On this record, the court concluded any error did not egregiously affect the fairness of the trial or the basis of the verdict and therefore affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case is submitted on multiple alternative legal/factual predicates that carry different consequences, you must preserve error by forcing clarity at trial—object, request separate submissions/findings, and get a ruling. Otherwise, even a real “unanimity/ambiguity” problem will likely be upheld under a highly deferential harm standard, a lesson that translates directly to broad, multi-theory “family violence” findings in Texas family-law cases.”
Daniel Cisneros Leyva v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a capital-murder/robbery appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether the State sufficiently corroborated an accomplice co-defendant’s testimony under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14, and whether the jury should have been instructed that other witnesses were accomplices. Applying the required method—disregarding the accomplice’s testimony and examining the remaining record—the court held the corroboration threshold is modest: non-accomplice evidence need only “tend to connect” the accused to the offense, not independently prove every element. Here, the non-accomplice evidence included (1) witnesses placing the group together shortly before the offense, (2) the defendant’s own statements putting him at the scene, (3) descriptions of the shooter’s clothing and a laser-equipped gun consistent with the defendant’s admissions, (4) cell-phone location/communication evidence showing coordination and post-incident calls, and (5) inconsistencies/falsehoods in the defendant’s accounts. The court also affirmed the refusal to give accomplice-witness instructions for other witnesses because the record contained no evidence they participated in the charged capital murder/robbery; mere association, presence, or tangential benefit is not enough to make someone an accomplice for charge purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case turns on one “insider” witness, don’t argue each corroborating fact must independently prove the whole story. Instead, focus the judge (or jury) on whether there are multiple independent circumstances that collectively *tend to connect* the accused to the alleged conduct (texts/calls, location data, third-party records, injuries/clothing/timeline congruence, and inconsistent denials). Conversely, resist attempts to discredit every supporting witness as “complicit” unless there is concrete evidence the witness participated in the *act alleged*, not just relationship drama or proximity.”
Erique Howard v. The State of Texas
COA14
After a jury convicted Erique Howard of multiple felonies, he elected judge sentencing. In a post-verdict discussion, the judge referenced the broad punishment range and encouraged the parties to confer and, if they wanted more control over the number, attempt to reach an agreement before the court assessed punishment. After a recess, the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement,” and the record contained no contemporaneous objection claiming coercion/retaliation and no motion for new trial or other post-judgment motion raising involuntariness or lack of judicial inquiry. On appeal, Howard argued the sentence reflected judicial vindictiveness for exercising the right to a jury trial and that the post-verdict sentencing agreement was involuntary (and the judge should have inquired into voluntariness). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not an increased sentence after a retrial, so Howard had to show actual vindictiveness from the record; the judge’s repeated statements disclaiming predetermination and the negotiated posture did not establish actual vindictiveness. The court further held the voluntariness and “duty to inquire” complaints were waived for lack of preservation because Howard did not object at the time and did not file a post-judgment motion to develop the issue. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you think a judge’s settlement/sentencing “range talk” crossed into coercion or retaliation, you must preserve it immediately. Make a record (objection/clarification/offer of proof), and if needed file timely post-judgment motions to develop involuntariness claims—otherwise the “the judge pressured me” narrative is usually unreviewable, and the agreement will be treated as voluntary.”
Lance Christopher Kassab and Lance Christopher Kassab, P.C. d/b/a The Kassab Law Firm v. Michael A. Pohl and The Law Office of Michael A. Pohl, PLLC
COA01
A Texas lawyer obtained another lawyer’s vendor-held files—attorney–client fee contracts and extensive client lists—through a marketing vendor involved in a prior dispute and used the information to target those individuals with notices that triggered hundreds of responses and follow-on barratry-related litigation and grievances. A Harris County jury found the contracts and lists were protectable trade secrets under the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA) and that the defendant misappropriated them, awarding multiple damages categories plus exemplary damages and fees. The First Court of Appeals agreed that client fee contracts and client lists can qualify as TUTSA trade secrets when they have independent economic value from secrecy and the owner takes reasonable confidentiality measures (including instructions and agreements with vendors and controlled access), and that evidence of acquiring the materials from a third party and then using them to conduct targeted outreach supported misappropriation. However, the court partially reversed the judgment because parts of the damages package and related relief were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and/or did not fit TUTSA’s permitted damages frameworks, and it remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Litigation Takeaway
“Client lists, intake/CRM exports, and even signed fee agreements can be trade secrets in Texas—especially in “client poaching” fights involving vendors or departing lawyers—but winning liability is only half the battle. To survive appeal, the firm must prove (1) real secrecy measures (including vendor confidentiality controls) and (2) a damages model that matches TUTSA (actual loss, unjust enrichment, or reasonable royalty) without double-counting; otherwise, even a strong verdict can be pared back or sent back for a do-over.”
Bouknight v. Llanelly Enterprises
COA01
Bouknight, a judgment creditor, sued Llanelly Enterprises for declaratory relief to establish that debtor Wilmot held a legal or beneficial ownership interest in a Houston house titled in Llanelly’s name, so the asset could be reached through turnover-style relief. Although the evidence showed Wilmot initially contracted to buy the home and participated in the transaction before title was shifted to Llanelly, the jury charge submitted only one liability question: whether the deed was “ineffective” to convey the property to Llanelly. The jury answered yes, but the charge did not ask—and the jury did not find—who owned the property (legal title, equitable title, beneficial ownership, nominee status, resulting/constructive trust, etc.). Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and JNOV/legal-sufficiency principles, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that because the verdict failed to resolve the only live, controlling issue pleaded (ownership), the verdict could not support a judgment for Bouknight and the trial court properly granted JNOV and rendered a take-nothing judgment. The court also accepted Llanelly’s argument as an affirming cross-point because it would vitiate the verdict and independently support affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any case where the real fight is “Who owns the asset?” you must submit jury questions that directly obtain an ownership finding that supports the requested judgment. A win on a proxy question (e.g., “ineffective deed,” “sham transfer,” “invalid document”) can still lose at the judgment stage because it does not establish the dispositive ultimate issue. For divorce and enforcement cases involving third-party/LLC title or nominee ownership, charge planning is outcome-determinative: plead the ownership theory and get verdict-grade findings (legal/equitable/beneficial ownership, alter ego, resulting/constructive trust, characterization) or expect a JNOV vulnerability.”
Cory Cornell Parker v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Cory Cornell Parker v. State, the defendant attended jury selection and the State’s case-in-chief but failed to return when trial resumed for the defense case, claiming by text that he was being taken by ambulance to a hospital. Despite hours of opportunity and repeated requests, neither Parker nor counsel provided basic, verifiable information (hospital name/location, provider contact, admission/discharge details, documentation), and counsel’s continuance requests were oral and unsupported. The trial court denied a continuance, declined to conduct an unverified phone call, found Parker’s mid-trial absence voluntary, and proceeded; Parker returned after deliberations began. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals held the record supported the trial court’s discretionary finding that Parker voluntarily absented himself and that denying the unsupported oral continuance requests was not an abuse of discretion. The court also rejected Parker’s ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s failure to file a written continuance motion or seek a writ of attachment because Parker did not show deficient performance and, critically, failed to show prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result). The court further found no reversible error regarding assessed costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“When the other side claims a last-minute “emergency” to stop a hearing or trial, frame it as a proof-and-diligence issue: insist on real-time, verifiable details and competent documentation, make the timeline record, and push for express findings. Unsupported, oral continuance requests—especially timed to derail an evidentiary turning point—can properly be denied, and a party who withholds readily confirmable information risks a finding that the absence is voluntary/strategic.”
In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children
COA06
In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases.”
Diana Reismann Sexton v. Gilbert Sexton
COA14
In a consolidated Fort Bend County divorce/SAPCR and interspousal personal-injury action, the wife (pro se) appealed numerous rulings after the trial court granted summary judgment on her tort claims, adopted a jury verdict naming the husband sole managing conservator, entered a property division, and included a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant finding against her. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals first analyzed whether each complaint was reviewable: it refused to revisit the indigency determination because it had already been finally reviewed under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(g); held challenges to temporary orders were moot because the final decree superseded them; and held possession/access issues were moot because the child turned 18 during the appeal. Because no reporter’s record was filed, the court could not evaluate preservation and was required to presume missing evidence supported the jury findings and discretionary rulings, making the wife’s attacks on the jury verdict and property division unreviewable. On the issues that could be decided on the clerk’s record, the court affirmed the summary judgment on the wife’s personal-injury claims as effectively a no-evidence disposition on essential elements (including causation and damages). But it held the appellate record did not affirmatively support the statutory predicates for a Chapter 11 vexatious-litigant designation, and therefore modified the final decree to delete that finding while otherwise affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appeals in divorce/SAPCR cases often turn on procedure, not merits: preserve error, secure a reporter’s record, and watch for mootness as children near 18. If you seek (or oppose) a vexatious-litigant finding, treat it like a record-driven statutory remedy—without evidence in the record establishing Chapter 11 predicates, an appellate court may strike the designation even while affirming the rest of the decree.”
In re L.C.
COA12
In a DFPS SAPCR, the adoptive parent sought mandamus relief attacking the trial court’s temporary/permanency orders—complaining of alleged Chapter 263 noncompliance, continued DFPS possession after an adversary hearing, and a sua sponte “aggravated circumstances” finding that waived reasonable-efforts and service-plan requirements. While the mandamus was pending, the court of appeals in an earlier original proceeding ordered the trial court to vacate its temporary order and return the children; the trial court complied. DFPS then moved to dismiss the underlying SAPCR and the trial court signed a dismissal order. The parent argued the mandamus was not moot because the aggravated-circumstances finding could cause collateral consequences in future DFPS cases, foster-care licensing/employment, and related criminal proceedings. The Tyler Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because intervening events eliminated any live controversy: the children had been returned and the DFPS case was dismissed, so no effectual mandamus relief remained. The court also rejected the collateral-consequences exception, reasoning that the challenged aggravated-circumstances language appeared only in nonfinal temporary/permanency orders, which do not preserve a justiciable controversy once the case is dismissed. The court dismissed the mandamus petition as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus jurisdiction can disappear fast in DFPS cases: once possession is restored and the underlying SAPCR is dismissed, appellate courts will usually treat challenges to temporary/permanency findings as moot. If you need to undo damaging interim language (like “aggravated circumstances”), press for immediate trial-court correction or expedited appellate relief while the case is still live; reputational or speculative future harms from nonfinal temporary orders typically won’t satisfy the narrow collateral-consequences exception.”
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
“Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule.”
Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.””
Christopher Joe Bradshaw, Sr. v. The State of Texas
COA03
In this Austin Court of Appeals criminal case, a father convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child argued the State failed to prove the statutory “30-or-more-days” duration element because the child’s testimony about being “ten” could be read to confine the abuse to a narrow, four-day window between the father’s arrival and the child’s 11th birthday. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and deference to jury inferences under Hooper, the court held the jury was not required to adopt that restrictive reading. The jury could reasonably interpret the age-based exchange as referring to only one type of conduct and could rely on frequency testimony (weekly/nightly conduct), CAC interview corroboration (“basically every night”), living-arrangement context, and digital forensic evidence showing pornography/child-pornography-related activity across multiple months to infer a course of abuse lasting at least 30 days. The court also rejected challenges to the mandatory life sentence, the jury charge on duration, and the admission of extraneous-offense evidence (including a prior Oklahoma lewd-molestation conviction used for enhancement), but it modified the judgment to correct a clerical miscitation to the enhancement subsection and affirmed as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-safety litigation, don’t let the case turn on a child’s imperfect “timing” testimony. Courts allow factfinders to reconcile age-based or vague time references with pattern/frequency testimony and objective corroboration (CAC interview details, device timelines, household routines) to establish a longer course of conduct and defeat “it could only have happened during a short window” defenses. Also, preserve evidentiary and charge complaints precisely, and double-check statutory citations in orders/judgments—miscitations may be corrected but can create avoidable appellate issues.”
Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV
COA14
In Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV, a longshore worker appealed a take-nothing judgment after a jury found neither she nor the vessel owner’s negligence proximately caused her injury. On appeal, she attacked the jury charge as confusing and as improperly permitting certain theories/defenses and a “no one responsible” outcome, and she also sought a new trial based on alleged juror and bailiff misconduct. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272–278 and the State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne framework, holding that most complaints were waived because counsel did not make timely, specific objections at the charge conference, did not ensure any requested charge language was in the clerk’s record in substantially correct form, and did not obtain an express ruling or endorsed refusal. The court rejected “preservation-by-paperwork,” explaining that pretrial filings and an unrecorded “tender” did not alert the trial court at the charge conference or create an appellate record under Cruz. The court declined to treat the alleged defects as fundamental error. As to the few issues arguably preserved, the court found no reversible charge error (one was not error; any other assumed error was harmless). The court also held the alleged juror/bailiff misconduct did not justify a new trial and affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial. The take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Jury-charge complaints live or die on preservation: object on the record before submission, state the defect plainly and specifically, tender substantially correct requested language, make sure it is file-stamped and included in the clerk’s record, and get a clear ruling/refusal. Pretrial proposed charges and vague “tenders” that don’t make it into the record won’t save an appeal, and misconduct/new-trial arguments require admissible proof tied to harm.”
Murray Lobb, PLLC v. Brandy Liss, Executor for the Estate of Mary James
COA14
In an estate dispute, the executor sued a former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the firm “switched sides” and harmed the estate by filing and prosecuting litigation for the former joint client and by taking litigation positions attacking an assignment the firm had drafted. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked past the fiduciary-duty label and focused on the conduct actually pleaded: court filings, pleadings, and other litigation communications in related judicial proceedings. Because those litigation communications were a “fundamental part/main ingredient” of the alleged wrongdoing, the claims were “based on or in response to” the firm’s exercise of the TCPA-protected right to petition under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4). The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion (affirming only the sanctions denial), rendered judgment dismissing the claims with prejudice, and remanded for a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under TCPA § 27.009(a)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party repackages complaints about what a lawyer filed, argued, served, or said in a case into a tort claim like “breach of fiduciary duty,” the TCPA may require early dismissal when the litigation communications are a core part of the claim—and dismissal triggers mandatory fee-and-cost shifting. Plead (or attack) the case based on what the petition actually alleges, not the cause-of-action label.”
Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof.”
Moises Galvan v. The State of Texas
COA08
In a bar‑shooting prosecution, Moises Galvan admitted shooting two men (killing one) but claimed self‑defense. After a mistrial in 2019, he was retried and convicted in 2023. On appeal, the El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed (1) claimed jury‑charge defects under Texas’s preservation‑dependent harm framework, (2) exclusion of a defense expert opinion under abuse‑of‑discretion gatekeeping and the need for a reliable, issue‑specific “fit” plus a proper offer of proof, (3) cumulative error, and (4) a Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claim under the Barker v. Wingo balancing test. The court held Galvan failed to show reversible charge error or harm, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the defense expert (and any error was not shown harmful in light of the video/forensic and impeachment evidence), cumulative‑error relief was unavailable without multiple harmful errors, and the Barker factors did not warrant the drastic remedy of dismissal with prejudice despite the lengthy delay between indictment and retrial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Crossover lesson for family‑violence dockets: (1) If you need an expert to support a self‑defense/“reasonable perception” narrative, you must build a tight admissibility foundation and preserve the excluded opinion with a detailed offer of proof—otherwise exclusion will usually stand on appeal. (2) Delay‑based fairness arguments require a record of assertion of the right and concrete prejudice (lost evidence/witnesses, impaired presentation, child‑focused harm), not generalized complaints. (3) “Cumulative error” rarely rescues a case when each individual ruling fails on preservation, error, or harm.”
Howard v. State
COA14
After a jury convicted Howard of two aggravated sexual assaults and aggravated robbery, he elected judge sentencing. At the punishment setting the judge discussed the punishment range, commented the case carried high exposure, and encouraged counsel-client consultation and negotiation. After a recess the parties announced a post-verdict punishment agreement, and the court imposed a 50-year sentence “in accordance with the plea agreement.” On appeal Howard argued (1) due process “judicial vindictiveness” for having gone to trial and (2) that the punishment agreement was involuntary and the court failed to conduct a voluntariness inquiry. The Fourteenth Court held the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because this was not a retrial with an increased sentence after a successful appeal; therefore Howard had to prove actual vindictiveness. The record showed the judge’s remarks were facilitative/admonitory, repeatedly disclaiming any predetermined punishment, and the 50-year term matched the parties’ post-verdict agreement—so no actual vindictiveness was shown. The court also held voluntariness and “failure to inquire” complaints were forfeited because Howard made no contemporaneous objection when the agreement was adopted and filed no post-judgment motion raising involuntariness. Judgments affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you intend to later claim an on-the-record agreement (Rule 11/MBA/MSA or post-ruling deal) was coerced or involuntary, you must object immediately and/or file a timely post-judgment motion—otherwise the complaint is likely waived. And “judicial vindictiveness” is a narrow doctrine; absent a true Pearce posture, you must prove actual retaliation from the record, not just tough judicial commentary or settlement encouragement.”
Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation
COA01
In a suit seeking emergency injunctive relief to stop a scheduled shareholder vote on the Exxon/Pioneer merger, the trial court denied the temporary injunction and the plaintiff nonsuited shortly thereafter. Exxon pursued sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel and law firm, and the trial court found the emergency temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/for an improper purpose, awarding $69,861.19 in sanctions (primarily attorney’s fees) and related relief. The First Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Chapter 10 and Rule 13 sanctions were available even though the sanctioned lawyer/firm argued they did not sign the challenged petition/motion, because the evidence supported that they were responsible for and pursued the filings and strategy. The court also rejected the argument that the trial court improperly “circumvented” Chapter 10/Rule 13 by referencing inherent authority; the order was supported under the statutory/rule frameworks, and the record supported the trial court’s factual findings that the injunction request lacked viable legal/factual support and was used as leverage tied to timing and a broader pattern of similar litigation. Nonsuit did not eliminate the court’s power to decide the collateral sanctions issue based on pre-dismissal conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
“Emergency TRO/temporary-injunction practice is sanctions-sensitive: a voluntary nonsuit after a failed temp hearing does not erase exposure, courts may look past “who signed” to who directed and pursued the filing, and timing/pattern evidence can support a finding that an emergency request was filed for improper settlement leverage—leading to significant fee-shifting sanctions under Chapter 10 and Rule 13.”
Rickye Henderson v. Ali Arabzadegan
COA03
In a quiet-title/deed-fraud lawsuit, the defendant repeatedly obstructed discovery—producing no responsive documents, asserting meritless objections, giving inconsistent explanations about missing devices/accounts, and refusing to comply with a court-ordered forensic imaging protocol designed to obtain electronically stored information (ESI) and test suspected fabrication. After incremental discovery orders and express findings of intentional concealment and repeated noncompliance, the trial court imposed “death-penalty” sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 by striking pleadings/defaulting the defendant on liability, leaving only damages for a bench prove-up. The defendant then failed to appear for the damages trial, and the court rendered judgment quieting title, declaring the deed void, and awarding damages and attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held the sanctions were “just,” directly related to the discovery abuse, and consistent with due process; it also rejected complaints that excluded evidence (including purported newly discovered racially offensive emails) required reversal in a post-default posture, and affirmed an interlocutory summary judgment disposing of the defendant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts can and will strike pleadings and default a party who games ESI discovery—especially when a tailored forensic imaging order (with privilege safeguards) is ignored. Build a careful record of repeated noncompliance, prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of lesser measures; on appeal, due-process and “critical evidence” arguments are unlikely to resurrect liability after a sanctions default, and the case may proceed only on damages (if the sanctioned party even shows up).”
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding.”
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.””
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed.”
In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children
COA06
In a DFPS Chapter 262 removal case filed in Panola County involving three children, the trial court signed an agreed final SAPCR order that adjudicated conservatorship and attempted to redirect child support for one child (Jarod). But a prior Denton County parentage order (and later modification) had already vested the Denton County district court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) over all SAPCR matters “in connection with” Jarod. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that while the Panola County Chapter 262 court had authority to enter emergency and temporary orders in the county where the child was found, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final order affecting Jarod absent a pre-rendition transfer under Family Code Chapter 155/262. Because jurisdiction cannot be created by agreement and a post-judgment transfer does not retroactively cure the defect, the appellate court vacated the final order as to Jarod, affirmed the final order as to the other children, and affirmed the denial of Mother’s motion for new trial attacking the voluntariness of the agreed order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Continuing exclusive jurisdiction is a non-negotiable, early-case triage issue: if any child is already subject to a prior paternity/support/SAPCR order in another Texas court, your current court may issue only Chapter 262 emergency/temporary relief until a proper transfer occurs. You cannot “agree” around CEJ, you cannot redirect or modify support tied to the CEJ court without transfer, and a post-judgment transfer will not save a final order—creating a real risk of partial vacatur in multi-child decrees.”
Timothy Ross v. The State of Texas
COA05
In a civil bond-forfeiture case, the State obtained a judgment nisi after Timothy Ross failed to appear. Within days, Ross—acting pro se—filed a document titled “Motion to Void Judgment Nisi,” which identified the case, provided his contact information, and substantively challenged the State’s entitlement to forfeiture. Despite that filing, the trial court signed a no‑answer default judgment. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 71’s substance-over-caption principle and the appearance standard from Smith v. Lippmann, holding that Ross’s pro se motion functioned as a timely answer/appearance because it showed an intent to contest the relief sought and provided identifying/contact information. Because an “answer” was on file, Rule 239 did not permit a no‑answer default. The court reversed the default judgment and remanded for proceedings on the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the respondent files anything timely that identifies the case and disputes the requested relief—even a mislabeled pro se “motion” or letter—Texas courts must often treat it as an answer/appearance. That closes the door on a no‑answer default and triggers notice and an opportunity to be heard (crucial in protective orders, SAPCR modifications, and termination cases). Petitioners should docket-audit for any such filing and proceed, at most, under post‑answer default with proper notice and proof.”
Skorich v. State; Woody v. State
COA07
During an interstate trucking trip, a seven-year-old arrived at a Hereford, Texas ER unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered in bruises. The mother and her non-parent boyfriend were convicted of injury to a child based on a course of conduct that included chronic water deprivation, corporal punishment, and delayed medical care. On appeal, they challenged Texas subject-matter jurisdiction and Deaf Smith County venue because much of the travel occurred outside Texas, and the boyfriend challenged the legal sufficiency of proof that he had a duty to act (required for omission liability under Penal Code § 22.04). The Seventh Court of Appeals treated the events as a continuing, mobile criminal episode and held Texas had jurisdiction because the State tied critical elements and the resulting serious bodily injury to Texas, including the child’s deterioration and medical crisis culminating in Texas. The court further held venue was proper in Deaf Smith County because the evidence connected the offense to that county, including the child’s emergent presentation and treatment in Hereford and supporting timeline/location proof. On the merits, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient that the boyfriend assumed “care, custody, and control” through cohabitation/household integration, discipline authority, shared finances, and influence over medical decisions—creating a legal duty supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient that the mother knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission through chronic deprivation of water and failure to obtain timely medical care, and it affirmed both convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“In custody and protective-order litigation, a parent’s live-in romantic partner can be treated as a de facto caregiver with enforceable duties when the facts show they functioned in the family unit (discipline, daily supervision, finances, medical decision-making). Also, “neglect” theories (withholding basic necessities and delaying medical care) can support endangerment and family-violence findings as an omission-based course of conduct—especially in mobile-family cases—so anchor proof to where the child’s decline manifested and where the crisis was discovered/treated to defeat jurisdiction/venue attacks.”
In the Interest of S.S.F.R. and S.J.F.R., Children
COA05
In this Collin County divorce case, a husband appealed the final decree regarding property division and child possession orders. However, acting without an attorney, the husband filed an appellate brief that failed to identify specific legal errors or provide citations to the trial record and legal authorities as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The Dallas Court of Appeals gave the husband an opportunity to fix these issues, but his amended brief remained noncompliant. The court analyzed the case by emphasizing that pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and that the court cannot act as an advocate or search the record for errors not clearly presented. Consequently, the court held that the husband waived his right to review and affirmed the trial court's divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Success on appeal requires more than just being unhappy with a trial court's decision; you must follow strict briefing rules. Whether represented by counsel or appearing pro se, an appellant must clearly tie their complaints to the trial record and specific legal authorities, or they risk having their appeal dismissed without the court ever considering the actual merits of their case.”
Christopher Redin v. The State of Texas
COA06
In a criminal dating‑violence assault-by-occlusion trial, the defendant sought to keep out evidence that he had assaulted other dating partners in California and moved for mistrial when witnesses briefly referenced an “open case” and “similar charges” despite a motion in limine. The trial court held a pretrial hearing, deferred its final ruling, then—after the defense’s cross-examination created a misleading “false impression” about the defendant’s behavior and the nature of the incident—admitted the other-victim testimony as rebuttal evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion: the extraneous assaults were admitted for a permissible non-character purpose (rebutting a false impression and providing context on disputed issues) and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also affirmed denial of mistrial, concluding the brief references to an “open case”/“similar charges” were not so prejudicial as to be incurable and limine violations alone did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In protective-order and SAPCR trials, “character” themes can backfire. If your cross-examination suggests the violence was isolated, the applicant is exaggerating, or the respondent is “not that kind of person,” you may open the door to prior-partner abuse evidence under Rule 404(b) as rebuttal to a false impression—often surviving Rule 403. Also, a motion in limine is only a speed bump: be ready to object, move to strike, request an instruction, and build a record showing why any mention of other cases is incurable if you want a mistrial.”
Texas A&M University–Commerce and Texas A&M University System v. Chandler Donaway
COA05
A student-athlete sued university entities and others for alleged negligent athletic training and delayed/improper medical treatment after an ankle injury, asserting health care liability claims that required a Texas Chapter 74 expert report. The trial court overruled the universities’ objections and denied their partial motion to dismiss, but on interlocutory appeal the Dallas Court of Appeals strictly applied § 74.351 and the Palacios/Bowie/Jelinek line, emphasizing the “four corners” rule and that “good faith” is an objective sufficiency test. Because the plaintiff’s expert report did not state defendant-specific standards of care, identify what each university entity did or failed to do that breached those standards, or provide a nonconclusory causal chain linking those breaches to the complained-of injuries, it was not an “objective good-faith effort.” The court reversed the order overruling objections/denying dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Conclusory medical-causation narratives don’t survive early gatekeeping: whether you’re attacking or offering expert proof, make it actor-specific and element-by-element—(1) the applicable standard/benchmark, (2) the specific deviation by that party, and (3) a reasoned, non-inferential causal chain. If the court has to “fill gaps” to connect the dots, the report (or letter/affidavit) is vulnerable to being struck or dismissed.”