Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Jackey Raylorn Martin v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jackey Raylorn Martin v. State, the defendant challenged the trial court’s pretrial ruling designating a forensic interviewer as the child-victim “outcry” witness under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072, arguing the wrong outcry witness was selected. The Amarillo Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation, holding that a pretrial outcry/admissibility ruling is only preliminary and does not preserve appellate complaint; to preserve error, the defendant had to object again when the designated outcry witness actually testified before the jury. Because no contemporaneous objection was made at trial, the issue was waived under Texas preservation rules. In the alternative, the court held that even if the designation were incorrect, any error was harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same key substance (penetration and identity) came in through other, unobjected-to evidence, including SANE/medical testimony and corroborating DNA evidence. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pretrial evidentiary wins don’t preserve anything by themselves: if you want appellate review, renew objections when the testimony/exhibit is offered at trial and get a clear ruling. And even a proven evidentiary mistake may not matter if the same core facts come in through other sources—so (1) object consistently across channels if you need harm, and (2) build redundant, independent proof if you’re the proponent."
Burns Surveying LLC v. Robert H. Burns and Jacob G. Pleasant
COA06
In this professional liability dispute, the plaintiffs sued a registered land surveyor for negligence but failed to attach the mandatory Chapter 150 certificate of merit to their original petition. After the trial court dismissed the claims without prejudice, the plaintiffs attempted to cure the defect by filing an amended petition with the required certificate in the same cause number. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 150.002 and Texas Supreme Court precedent, concluding that the 'first-filed' requirement applies to the very first petition asserting the claim in a specific case. The court held that a dismissal without prejudice requires the claimant to initiate an entirely new lawsuit to satisfy the contemporaneous filing requirement, and an amended petition cannot cure the initial failure to file.
Litigation Takeaway
"When suing a licensed professional like a surveyor, the certificate of merit must be attached to the very first petition filed. If the case is dismissed without prejudice for failing to do so, you cannot fix the error by amending the existing lawsuit; you must file a brand-new suit with a new cause number to satisfy the 'first-filed' rule."
Crayton v. State
COA03
In Crayton v. State, a defendant challenged the assessment of court costs because the trial court failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry into his 'ability to pay' as required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether this statutory 'shall' requirement created an absolute right or a forfeitable one. Applying Court of Criminal Appeals precedent, the court determined that the inquiry is not a fundamental systemic requirement. Therefore, because the defendant failed to object at sentencing, he forfeited the error under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held that the omission was not reversible error because the defendant retained a statutory right to seek post-judgment relief for financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"In quasi-criminal enforcement matters, 'mandatory' statutory duties are not self-executing for purposes of appeal. If a trial court fails to conduct a required financial inquiry or make a specific finding, you must interpose a timely objection on the record to preserve the error. If you miss the opportunity to object, look to post-judgment statutory remedies for financial hardship rather than relying on an appeal for reversal."
In re Quintilya Thomas
COA08
In an original proceeding arising from family-law temporary orders, the relator asked the El Paso Court of Appeals for an emergency stay of “default temporary orders” but filed only a Rule 52.10 motion and no petition for writ of mandamus. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional: under Tex. R. App. P. 52.1 an original proceeding is commenced only by filing a mandamus petition, and Rule 52.10 temporary relief is merely ancillary and is available only after a petition invokes the court’s original jurisdiction. Because no petition was on file, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to grant any temporary relief or stay and dismissed the motion for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling after a mandamus petition is filed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you need an emergency stay from a court of appeals in a family case, you cannot file a standalone “emergency stay pending mandamus” motion. File the mandamus petition first (or simultaneously) to invoke original jurisdiction; only then can Rule 52.10 temporary relief be considered—otherwise the motion will be dismissed and valuable time will be lost while temporary orders remain enforceable."
David Aston v. James Whittington and Tara Whittington
COA05
In a contract dispute that went to trial in Hunt County, the trial court entered a post‑answer default judgment after defendant David Aston and his counsel failed to appear for the reset trial setting. Aston timely moved for new trial supported by affidavit evidence that he did not know of the trial date and relied on counsel to communicate settings; plaintiffs countered with proof that Aston’s counsel received and opened the court’s electronic notice and argued counsel’s inaction should be imputed to Aston. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the matter as a straightforward Craddock analysis for post‑answer default judgments and held the trial court abused its discretion by denying a new trial: (1) the failure to appear was shown to be the result of mistake/accident rather than intentional conduct or conscious indifference, and the court declined to import the summary‑judgment “imputation” framework into the Craddock default context; (2) Aston “set up” meritorious defenses by pleading legally cognizable defenses and offering prima facie support, which does not require proving the case at the new‑trial stage; and (3) once Aston alleged no delay or injury, plaintiffs failed to show concrete retrial prejudice beyond the inconvenience of trying the case. The court reversed the post‑answer default judgment and remanded for a merits trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post‑answer defaults are disfavored in Texas, and a party who misses trial because of notice breakdowns or calendar‑conflict missteps can often win a new trial under Craddock—especially when the client swears they lacked actual knowledge of the setting, promptly sought relief, and sets up a real defense. On the flip side, to keep a default, the nonmovant must bring evidence of actual retrial prejudice (lost witnesses/evidence, time‑sensitive issues), not just “they opened the e‑notice” or “a new trial is inconvenient.”"
Crayton v. State
COA03
After being convicted of intoxication manslaughter, John Edgar Crayton, Jr. was assessed court costs without the trial court conducting the mandatory 'ability-to-pay' inquiry required by Article 42.15(a-1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Crayton appealed, arguing the omission was reversible error. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory scheme alongside recent precedent, determining that the inquiry is a procedural right rather than a fundamental one. The court held that because Crayton failed to object to the omission during sentencing when given the opportunity, he forfeited the error on appeal. Furthermore, the court held the error was not reversible because the law provides a post-judgment mechanism for defendants to seek relief due to financial hardship at any time.
Litigation Takeaway
"Never rely on a trial court to perform a 'mandatory' statutory inquiry regarding a client's ability to pay fees or costs; counsel must proactively object to any omission on the record or risk waiving the issue for appeal. In the event of a waiver, practitioners should utilize post-judgment hardship statutes to seek relief rather than pursuing a likely-to-fail appeal."
Musk v. Brody
COA03
In this defamation case, Benjamin Brody argued that Elon Musk's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss was a nullity—and therefore untimely—because it was signed by out-of-state counsel before their pro hac vice admission was finalized. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed Texas's overarching policy of prioritizing the merits of a dispute over technical procedural "traps" and looked to persuasive authority regarding attorney signatures. The court held that if a trial court subsequently grants a pro hac vice motion, that admission cures the signature defect on earlier filings, meaning the TCPA motion was properly before the court and filed within the 60-day statutory window.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending pro hac vice admission does not render a timely filed motion a "nullity"; provided the admission is eventually granted, the signature defect is cured, protecting parties from losing statutory rights like a TCPA dismissal due to technical filing deadlines."
Chenier v. State
COA01
In Chenier v. State, a defendant appealed his murder conviction, contending that the trial judge made improper comments during voir dire and violated the Confrontation Clause by limiting the cross-examination of a witness regarding third-party bias and threats. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the judge's voir dire remarks as explanatory hypotheticals regarding legal elements rather than biased commentary on the evidence. Regarding the cross-examination, the court emphasized that while defendants have a right to explore witness bias, trial courts maintain discretion to limit testimony that is speculative or marginally relevant. The court held that because the defense failed to provide a concrete offer of proof linking the alleged third-party threats to the witness's specific motive to testify, the trial court's limitations were reasonable and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully impeach a witness based on third-party threats or intimidation, you must establish a concrete logical link between the threat and the witness's motive to lie; without a specific offer of proof connecting the two, trial courts have broad discretion to limit your cross-examination."
The City of Arlington v. Airport Properties, Inc.
COA02
After Airport Properties, Inc. sued the City of Arlington, the City filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea, and the City filed an interlocutory appeal. While the appeal was pending, Airport Properties nonsuited all its claims against the City. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, which provides an 'absolute right' to nonsuit claims before all evidence is introduced. Because the City had no pending counterclaims for affirmative relief, the court held that the nonsuit extinguished the live controversy, rendering the interlocutory appeal moot and stripping the appellate court of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plaintiff can use a Rule 162 nonsuit as a 'kill switch' to moot a pending interlocutory appeal and reset the jurisdictional battle, provided the respondent has not anchored the litigation with an independent claim for affirmative relief."
Castillo-Villamin v. State
COA02
In Castillo-Villamin v. State, the appellant challenged his convictions for aggravated kidnapping and robbery, arguing he should have received a sentencing mitigation because he released the victim in a 'safe place' and that the evidence for a 'deadly weapon' was insufficient since the knife was not immediately recovered. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'safe place' defense using the Butcher factors—specifically remoteness, time of day, and the victim's condition—concluding that abandoning a victim at night in a remote area while intentionally depriving them of a cell phone precludes a finding of safety. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the victim’s and accomplice’s testimony was sufficient to establish the use of a deadly weapon regardless of when the physical weapon was found.
Litigation Takeaway
"Legal 'safety' requires more than the absence of immediate physical violence; it requires a 'communication nexus.' In family law contexts, proving that a party deprived a spouse or child of a phone or means to call for help can be used to defeat claims that a location was safe or to establish endangerment. Additionally, credible testimony alone is sufficient to secure family violence findings involving weapons, even if the weapon itself is never recovered by the police."