Opinion Library

Keenan DeAndre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In this case, a trial court orally waived a $6,000 statutory fine for a defendant found to be indigent, yet the subsequent written judgment erroneously included the fine. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the conflict between the judge's verbal ruling and the written record. The court analyzed the 'bench controls the pen' doctrine, which dictates that an oral pronouncement made in open court is the legally binding judgment, while the written order is merely a record of that act. Finding a clear conflict, the court held that the oral waiver must prevail and modified the written judgment to delete the $6,000 fine.

Westyn Gregory Whetstone v. The State of Texas

COA07

In Whetstone v. State, a defendant was convicted of Class B misdemeanor criminal trespass, but the trial court's written judgment incorrectly recorded the offense as a more serious Class A misdemeanor involving a habitation. On appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals performed an independent review of the record and found that the State had explicitly abandoned the higher charge before the jury was instructed. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), the court analyzed the discrepancy as a clerical error and held that it had a mandatory duty to reform the judgment to 'make the record speak the truth.' The court modified the judgment to reflect the correct statute and offense degree, ensuring the defendant's criminal history accurately reflected the actual adjudication.

COA10

In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, S.W. appealed an order committing her to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Her court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief asserting the appeal was frivolous and a motion to withdraw. The Tenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 51.101(a), which requires counsel appointed at the initial detention stage to represent the child 'until the case is terminated.' Drawing a parallel to the Texas Supreme Court’s 'continuing duty' doctrine in parental rights termination cases (In re P.M.), the court interpreted 'termination' to mean the exhaustion of all appeals through the Texas Supreme Court. Consequently, while the court affirmed the commitment order, it denied the attorney's motion to withdraw.

C. Q. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

COA03

The Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate a mother’s parental rights following allegations of drug use and child neglect. While the mother demonstrated significant recent progress, including stable housing and numerous negative urinalyses, she continued to test positive for cocaine in hair follicle tests. Additionally, her live-in fiancé refused to submit to drug testing. The Court of Appeals analyzed the conflicting forensic evidence and the mother's choice of partners under the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard. The court held that the trial court was entitled to credit the hair follicle results over other tests and that the presence of an untested partner constituted endangering conduct. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the termination of her parental rights.

In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield

COA06

Relators sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Panola County court to grant a mandatory transfer of a SAPCR proceeding to Smith County, where an adoption was pending, pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 155.201(a-1). The child's mother had filed a controverting affidavit, and the trial court had scheduled a hearing on the matter. The Sixth Court of Appeals analyzed the statutory framework, noting that while Section 155.201(a-1) is mandatory, Section 155.204(e) requires a hearing when a transfer is contested. The court held that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the Relators failed to show that the trial court had refused to rule or that an unreasonable amount of time had passed, especially since a hearing was already on the docket.

Keenan Deandre Black v. The State of Texas

COA02

In Black v. State, the court addressed a conflict where a trial judge orally waived a $6,000 fine during sentencing, yet the final written judgment still included the charge. Additionally, the defendant argued his probation should not be revoked because his supervision officer had allegedly modified his deadlines. The Second Court of Appeals analyzed the 'Rendition vs. Entry' doctrine, affirming that a judge's oral pronouncement in open court is the legally operative event that controls over a conflicting written document. Furthermore, the court held that community supervision is a judicial order, not a private contract, meaning only a judge—not a probation officer—has the authority to modify its terms. The court modified the judgment to delete the fine but upheld the probation revocation.

IN RE ADNAN UMAIR JANJUA AND UZMA JANJUA, Relators

COA05

The Fifth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of mandamus filed against a county clerk who allegedly refused to file specific documents. The court analyzed its jurisdiction under Texas Government Code § 22.221, noting that while it has the power to issue writs against judges, its authority over non-judicial officers like clerks is strictly limited to instances where the writ is necessary to protect the court's own appellate jurisdiction. Because the relators did not demonstrate that the clerk's refusal interfered with a pending appeal, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to intervene.

Christopher Michael Green v. The State of Texas

COA05

In Green v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals examined whether a trial court erred by admitting SANE (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) records of an unavailable victim during a criminal punishment phase. The defendant argued that admitting graphic forensic evidence without the victim's testimony was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 because he could not cross-examine the witness. The court analyzed the records' high probative value regarding the defendant's character and pattern of behavior, especially since the forensic evidence was linked to the defendant via DNA. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, ruling that forensic medical records are admissible to show a pattern of conduct even without live testimony from the victim.

Caldwell v. Quaid

COA14

In a divorce proceeding involving complex property characterization, the Husband designated an expert for tracing and valuation but failed to provide the actual tracing reports until six days before trial. The trial court excluded the late-disclosed tracing testimony while permitting testimony on the timely-disclosed valuation. On appeal, the Husband argued the exclusion constituted an improper 'death-penalty' sanction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, clarifying that the exclusion was a mandatory application of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The court held that because the ruling did not preclude the Husband's entire defense or claim, it did not rise to the level of a death-penalty sanction and was a proper exercise of discretion due to the lack of good cause or showing of non-prejudice.

In the matter of J.C., a juvenile

COA04

A juvenile, J.C., appealed his adjudication for aggravated robbery and assault, arguing that the appellate court should apply a 'factual sufficiency' standard of review to his case—a standard used in certain civil matters that allows the court to weigh evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reaffirming that juvenile delinquency proceedings are 'quasi-criminal' and subject only to the strict 'legal sufficiency' standard used in adult criminal cases. The court held that as long as any rational jury could have found the defendant guilty based on the evidence viewed in favor of the verdict (such as the victim's identification and fingerprint evidence found in this case), the adjudication must be upheld.