Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA14
In Rodrigues v. Office of the Attorney General, a father attempted to discharge over $500,000 in child support arrears by claiming the state failed to respond to his private correspondence. He further challenged the authority of the Assistant Attorney General to represent the state in court. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit, finding that the Office of the Attorney General has clear statutory authority under the Texas Family Code to participate in child support actions. The court also clarified that procedural defects, such as a lack of formal service, do not warrant a reversal if the complaining party actually attends the hearing and participates in the legal process.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Office of the Attorney General holds broad statutory power in child support matters that is very difficult to challenge procedurally. Furthermore, if you appear and argue your case at a hearing, you generally waive the right to complain about technical notice or service errors later."
Mooneyham v. Knapp
COA14
After the death of George Knapp, Terry Mooneyham sought to establish that the two had shared an informal (common-law) marriage for seventeen years. Knapp’s estate argued there was no evidence of a specific agreement to be married and successfully moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, analyzing Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2) and holding that a claimant’s own affidavit asserting a direct agreement to be married constitutes sufficient evidence to survive a pretrial dismissal. The court clarified that whether such testimony is 'self-serving' is a matter of credibility for a jury to decide at trial, rather than a reason for a judge to throw out the case early.
Litigation Takeaway
"In common-law marriage litigation, a claimant's sworn testimony that a specific agreement to marry existed is legally sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, shifting the focus from pretrial dismissal to the credibility of the witnesses at trial."
Brown v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Brown v. State, police returned to an apartment for a second search after an initial search warrant had expired. Rather than seek a new warrant, officers relied on consent from the apartment manager and the victim’s family (who were clearing out the unit) and on the defendant’s own statement during an interview that he did not live there and had not lived there for 18 months. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression issue under Fourth Amendment standing principles, applying Texas’s abandonment doctrine (disclaimer of a possessory/privacy interest defeats a reasonable expectation of privacy) and the apparent-authority consent doctrine (a warrantless search is valid if officers reasonably believe the consenting third party has authority). Under the totality of circumstances—primary tenant deceased, unit being vacated by the family, manager’s consent, and Brown’s explicit disavowal of residency—the court held Brown lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore lacked standing to challenge the search; the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The court also rejected claims of judicial bias, charge error, and ineffective assistance, and affirmed the murder conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Move-out disclaimers can become legal waivers: if a party tells police, a landlord, or a court “I don’t live there,” that statement can be used to establish abandonment and defeat privacy/standing arguments—making warrantless entry/search more defensible based on third-party consent. In family-law crossovers (protective orders, divorce/custody disputes), counsel should carefully manage residency/possession statements and build evidence of continuing ties (keys, utilities, mail, property left behind) if privacy or possessory rights will matter."
IN RE LARAB SHIZA BUTT, Relator
COA05
In a child possession dispute involving a writ of attachment, the relator sought a writ of mandamus to vacate temporary orders issued by a Dallas County associate judge. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the petition based on procedural failures, specifically the relator's failure to provide a complete and sworn record as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7. The court held that without a sufficient record, it is impossible to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, effectively insulating the lower court's decision from review.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking emergency relief from the Court of Appeals, procedural precision is just as important as the legal argument; failing to provide a complete, sworn record of the trial court's proceedings will result in an automatic denial of your petition, regardless of the merits of your case."
National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Payne & Keller Company, By and Through Its Duly-Appointed Receiver, Peter D. Protopapas
COA14
In this case, a receiver attempted to domesticate a South Carolina order in Texas under Chapter 35 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the Texas version of the UEFJA). Third-party insurers intervened and filed motions to vacate, then attempted to appeal the filing as a final judgment. The Court of Appeals analyzed whether domesticating a non-final foreign order "upgrades" its status to a final Texas judgment. The court held that because the underlying South Carolina order was interlocutory on its face, its domestication in Texas resulted only in an interlocutory order, not a final appealable judgment. Consequently, because the trial court had not ruled on the motions to vacate and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal for such a filing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domesticating a foreign order in Texas under Chapter 35 only creates an appealable judgment if the original foreign order was final; if the out-of-state order is temporary or interlocutory, it remains unappealable in Texas, potentially freezing enforcement if a motion to vacate is pending."
Cove Funding, LP and its Subsidiary HPS Admin, LLC v. Marcy Barba and Jorge Barba
COA03
In a post-judgment enforcement proceeding, a third-party lender intervened in a receivership, asserting a priority security interest and requesting the turnover of assets. The trial court denied the turnover motion but did not issue specific findings regarding the validity of the lender's lien. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order met the 'discrete issue' finality standard for receiverships or qualified as a mandatory injunction. The court held that because the order was a simple denial that did not conclusively adjudicate the underlying ownership rights or substantial interests of the third party, it was an interlocutory order over which the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"To prevent third-party claimants from disrupting a receivership through interlocutory appeals, practitioners should seek a simple denial of turnover requests rather than a formal adjudication of the claim's merits. Conversely, third parties seeking to appeal a denial must ensure the order contains specific findings that finally adjudicate their substantial rights or act as a mandatory injunction."
Shelton v. Flores
COA14
In Shelton v. Flores, a government employee (Shelton) attempted to dismiss claims against himself by filing a Rule 91a motion under the Texas Tort Claims Act's (TTCA) election-of-remedies provision after both he and his employer, the City of Houston, were sued. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 101.106(e), which states that an employee shall be dismissed 'on the motion of the governmental unit.' The court held that because the City did not join or file the motion to dismiss Shelton, the statutory condition precedent was not met. The court concluded that individual employees lack standing to 'self-dismiss' under this provision without the employer’s active participation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Government employees, such as CPS caseworkers or law enforcement officers, cannot unilaterally exit a lawsuit under the TTCA election-of-remedies provision unless the government agency they work for formally moves for their dismissal. This provides family law litigants with strategic leverage to keep individual defendants in a case for discovery purposes, especially when an agency is reluctant to admit the employee was acting within the scope of their employment."
Cirilo Gomez-Lagunas v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Gomez-Lagunas v. State, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief in a murder appeal, asserting the record presented no non-frivolous issues. The First Court of Appeals performed its required independent review of the entire record under Anders and Texas Anders cases (including High and Bledsoe), found no arguable grounds for reversal and no reversible error, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the 35-year sentence. For family-law purposes, the opinion underscores that an Anders affirmance reflects both counsel’s and the appellate court’s conclusion that there is no viable appellate challenge, strengthening arguments that the conviction is final and reliable for later Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q) termination predicates.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an incarcerated parent’s conviction has been affirmed after an Anders review, treat it as a strong finality milestone: use the memorandum opinion and mandate to defeat “pending appeal” delay tactics and to support TPR predicate grounds based on serious criminal conduct or long-term incarceration (e.g., § 161.001(b)(1)(L) and (Q))."
Sherie A. McArthur, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CLARENCE MAURICE LOGAN, JR., Appellant V. CONCORD HOUSTON JFK BLVD HOTEL II LLC, A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; CONCORD HOSPITALITY ENTERPRISES COMPANY, LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY; AND DOES 1-20, Appellees
COA14
In McArthur v. Concord Houston JFK Blvd Hotel II LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed an appellant's failure to prosecute their appeal. After the clerk's record was filed, the appellant failed to file a brief or a motion for extension for several months. The court issued a formal 10-day warning under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(b), often called a 'death notice,' requiring a response to avoid dismissal. When the appellant ignored the notice, the court analyzed the procedural failure under Rule 42.3 and held that dismissal for want of prosecution was necessary. The court concluded that ignoring mandatory briefing deadlines and subsequent show-cause orders effectively abandons the appeal, leaving the panel no choice but to dismiss without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas appellate law, deadlines are not mere suggestions; missing a briefing deadline and failing to respond to a court's 10-day 'death notice' will result in the summary dismissal of your case, making the trial court's judgment final and unappealable regardless of the merits of your claim."
Lalita R. Morey v. Oaks of Devonshire Homeowners Association, Inc.
COA01
After a July 14, 2025 final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 23, 2025—outside the 30-day deadline in TRAP 26.1 and also outside the 15-day grace period in TRAP 26.3—and filed no post-judgment motions that would have extended the timetable to 90 days. The First Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over a standard appeal because an untimely notice of appeal does not invoke appellate jurisdiction under TRAP 25.1(c). The appellant then asked the court to treat the late notice as a restricted appeal, but the court refused because a restricted appeal has its own jurisdictional prerequisites and the notice must strictly include the statements required by TRAP 25.1(d)(7) (including non-participation in the hearing and no timely post-judgment filings). Because the notice did not contain those mandatory declarations, the court could not construe it as a restricted appeal and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if you miss the 30-day notice-of-appeal deadline (and the 15-day extension window), you’re out—unless you properly perfect a restricted appeal. If you need a restricted appeal, your notice must expressly track TRAP 25.1(d)(7)’s required statements; a generic notice of appeal cannot be “converted” later by briefing or argument."