Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
In the Interest of J.B.S. and R.G.S., Children
COA13
In a Chapter 157 SAPCR enforcement proceeding, Mother sought contempt-style relief against Father for alleged violations of multiple prior orders. The trial court dismissed/denied the enforcement motion on threshold legal grounds (treating many alleged violations as pre-final-order and effectively barred) and signed an order denying enforcement. Mother attempted a direct appeal, arguing the denial was a final, appealable order under Texas Family Code § 109.002. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the proceeding and reiterated that contempt/enforcement determinations under Chapter 157 are not reviewable by direct appeal; any review lies, if at all, in mandamus (and habeas if confinement is ordered). Because the order was an unappealable enforcement/contempt ruling, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a signed order that ends a Chapter 157 enforcement hearing is appealable. If the relief sought/ruling made is contempt-type enforcement, the correct review vehicle is usually mandamus (or habeas if confinement is involved); filing a direct appeal can waste time and jeopardize your client’s only effective remedy."
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice."
Carlos Franco Hernandez a/k/a Carlos Alberto Hernandez Orta v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a criminal appeal arising from sexual assault allegations involving a 13-year-old, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed two trial objections that commonly surface in family-law crossover cases: (1) whether the jury charge improperly included a Penal Code § 8.04(a) voluntary-intoxication instruction when the defendant did not affirmatively plead intoxication as a defense, and (2) whether admitting the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) nurse’s written report was reversible error as improper “bolstering.” The court held the intoxication instruction was proper because the record contained evidence of drinking from multiple sources (including the defendant’s admissions and the history reflected in the SANE documentation), and Texas law allows the instruction whenever evidence could lead jurors to think intoxication excuses conduct; the instruction tracked the statute and did not comment on the weight of the evidence. The court also held the SANE report was not excludable or reversible on a “bolstering” theory; bolstering is not a free-standing basis to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, and the argument largely collapses into hearsay/predicate issues that were not the focus of the appellate complaint. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When dealing with SANE/medical records and repeated narratives in SAPCR or protective-order trials, “bolstering” is usually the wrong objection—and often an easy one to defeat if the exhibit is independently admissible. The real battleground is foundation, purpose, and embedded hearsay (plus Rule 403/redactions). Also, if intoxication evidence is in the record, expect courts to give clarifying/limiting instructions to prevent a “drinking excuses it” theme—so plan your proof and objections accordingly and preserve the correct grounds."
Strong v. State
COA02
In Strong v. State, a murder defendant sought a jury-charge instruction giving him the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. The trial court refused because the presumption under Texas Penal Code §§ 9.31 and 9.32 is unavailable when the actor is “engaged in criminal activity” at the time of the force. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals held the record conclusively showed Strong was engaged in criminal activity—unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code § 46.04—because he admitted he was a felon, knew he could not possess firearms, and used a firearm during the incident. Strong attempted to avoid the “criminal activity” bar by arguing § 46.04 was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, which (he claimed) would mean his possession was not “criminal activity” and the presumption instruction was required. The court rejected using an as-applied Second Amendment attack as a vehicle to obtain the presumption instruction on these facts and affirmed. Holding: the trial court did not err in denying the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction because Strong’s felon-in-possession status was contemporaneous criminal activity, and his as-applied constitutional challenge did not entitle him to the statutory presumption in the charge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When firearms are involved, a party’s prohibited-possessor status can strip away “presumptive reasonableness” / stand-your-ground framing. If the person with the gun was committing a firearms-possession offense at the time, Texas courts can treat that as contemporaneous “criminal activity” that defeats favorable self-defense presumptions—even if the party tries to reframe the issue with a constitutional challenge. In family cases, that supports protective orders, firearm surrender provisions, and best-interest arguments focused on ongoing illegality and risk."
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial."
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In a Dallas County post-judgment family case, the relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a hearing on a motion for jurisdictional production and a motion to disqualify. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied relief at the threshold because the petition omitted the mandatory Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k) certification that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record—an omission the court treated as an independently sufficient reason to deny mandamus. The court also held, in the alternative, that even with a compliant petition the relator failed to meet the two mandamus prerequisites under In re Prudential—showing neither a clear abuse of discretion nor that appeal was an inadequate remedy—so extraordinary relief compelling findings was not warranted on the record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus in Texas is strict-compliance and strict-proof: include the TRAP 52.3(k) certification (and back every fact with record evidence) or your petition can be denied outright, and even then you must build a record that concretely shows both a clear abuse of discretion and why an appeal cannot fix the problem—especially for post-judgment “findings after a hearing” complaints."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."
In the Interest of H.S., a Child
COA02
In a Texas child-protection/SAPCR appeal, the appellant failed to pay or make payment arrangements for the clerk’s record. After the district clerk notified the court of appeals of the nonpayment, the Second Court of Appeals issued a written notice giving the appellant ten days to (1) arrange payment and (2) file proof of those arrangements, expressly warning that the appeal would be dismissed for want of prosecution if not cured. The appellant did nothing. Applying the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing the appellant’s duty to fund the clerk’s record and the court’s authority to dismiss when the record is not filed due to nonpayment, the court concluded the defect was curable, that adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure were provided, and that the failure to act constituted a failure to prosecute. The court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits and taxed appellate costs against the appellant.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas appeals can be lost on procedure before briefing: immediately confirm record costs, make payment arrangements that satisfy the clerk, and file proof with the court of appeals within any cure deadline. If you ignore a nonpayment notice, dismissal for want of prosecution is likely and your client may still be taxed with appellate costs—leaving the trial court’s orders fully in place and enforceable."
Holloway v. State
COA02
In an indecency-by-exposure prosecution, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to the State’s use of “context” evidence surrounding the charged incident: a non-graphic photo of the child complainant and testimony about closely timed, related encounters (an earlier exposure-like incident involving the child’s mother, a later door-checking/Ring-video incident at her home, and another school-area exposure-type event). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Rule 403’s pro-admission presumption and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, emphasizing that evidence is not excluded merely because it is harmful; exclusion requires that unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value. Because the defense made intent (intent to arouse or gratify) a contested issue, the surrounding-incident evidence had heightened probative force to show sexual intent and to provide a coherent narrative explaining recognition and the complainant’s mother’s reactions. The court also noted safeguards reducing 403 risk, including limiting instructions and the absence of undue delay or cumulativeness. It held the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement in admitting both the contextual testimony and the child’s photograph and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 403 is a “substantial imbalance” rule, not a “keep it nice” rule: when intent, danger, or credibility is disputed, closely connected prior/other incidents and contextual photos can come in to “connect the dots,” especially if you (1) tie the evidence to a specific contested issue (intent/absence of mistake/fear), (2) show tight temporal and factual proximity, (3) keep the presentation non-cumulative, and (4) request/offer limiting instructions. Conversely, if you argue accident/mistake/innocent intent, expect the court to allow more context evidence and preserve your position with targeted objections and Rule 105 limits."
In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children
COA04
In a Department-initiated termination suit, both parents challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and termination sufficiency frameworks (legal sufficiency: view evidence favorably to the finding and defer to credibility determinations; factual sufficiency: consider the whole record and whether disputed evidence is so significant that a firm belief could not be formed). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support predicate grounds—especially endangerment and continued controlled-substance use coupled with refusal/failure to complete treatment—based on Mother’s admissions of frequent methamphetamine and marijuana use, physical evidence of methamphetamine, and an extensive drug-test history (33 positives out of 36 requests, including shortly before trial), along with service-plan noncompliance and untreated mental-health concerns. As to Father, the court affirmed termination and rejected his best-interest challenge, emphasizing his refusal to drug test and meaningfully engage in services, unmanaged mental-health issues (including self-medicating with street-obtained pills), unstable housing/employment, and the children’s trauma responses tied to domestic-violence risk factors. Weighing the chronic, unresolved risk factors against the children’s stability and progress in the maternal grandmother’s home and her intent to adopt, the court upheld the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination (and high-stakes custody) cases are won on patterns, not episodes: repeated positive/missed drug tests, refusal or discharge from treatment, unmanaged mental health, and ongoing domestic-violence risk factors can establish endangerment and drive the best-interest analysis. Document the services offered and the parent’s noncompliance, and contrast ongoing instability with the child’s progress and permanency in a stable placement—late, last-minute re-engagement is often too little, too late."