Opinion Library

In re L.C.

COA12

In a DFPS SAPCR, the adoptive parent sought mandamus relief attacking the trial court’s temporary/permanency orders—complaining of alleged Chapter 263 noncompliance, continued DFPS possession after an adversary hearing, and a sua sponte “aggravated circumstances” finding that waived reasonable-efforts and service-plan requirements. While the mandamus was pending, the court of appeals in an earlier original proceeding ordered the trial court to vacate its temporary order and return the children; the trial court complied. DFPS then moved to dismiss the underlying SAPCR and the trial court signed a dismissal order. The parent argued the mandamus was not moot because the aggravated-circumstances finding could cause collateral consequences in future DFPS cases, foster-care licensing/employment, and related criminal proceedings. The Tyler Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because intervening events eliminated any live controversy: the children had been returned and the DFPS case was dismissed, so no effectual mandamus relief remained. The court also rejected the collateral-consequences exception, reasoning that the challenged aggravated-circumstances language appeared only in nonfinal temporary/permanency orders, which do not preserve a justiciable controversy once the case is dismissed. The court dismissed the mandamus petition as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Mandamus jurisdiction can disappear fast in DFPS cases: once possession is restored and the underlying SAPCR is dismissed, appellate courts will usually treat challenges to temporary/permanency findings as moot. If you need to undo damaging interim language (like “aggravated circumstances”), press for immediate trial-court correction or expedited appellate relief while the case is still live; reputational or speculative future harms from nonfinal temporary orders typically won’t satisfy the narrow collateral-consequences exception."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas

COA13

In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof."

Evidence

In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez

COA03

In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.

Litigation Takeaway

"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."

Evidence

Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.

Litigation Takeaway

"Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.”"

Geoffrey Quinn v. Kimberly A. Sergeant

COA01

After a trial court rendered a divorce judgment, the parties reached a settlement through mediation while an appeal was pending. The appellant requested that the appellate court set aside the trial court's original judgment and remand the case for the entry of a new judgment based on the Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA). The appellee argued for a simple dismissal of the appeal. Analyzing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the First Court of Appeals determined that it had the authority to vacate the trial court's judgment without reaching the merits to facilitate a settlement. The court held that setting aside the judgment and remanding for rendition was appropriate, ensuring that the parties would not be stuck with an outdated and enforceable decree that conflicted with their new agreement.

Litigation Takeaway

"When settling a case on appeal, parties should request that the appellate court set aside the trial court's judgment and remand for a new judgment under TRAP 42.1(a)(2)(B). Simply dismissing the appeal leaves the original judgment intact and enforceable, which can create significant legal friction if the settlement terms differ from the original court order."

Graham Wilson Gilliam v. Diane Werlein Gilliam

COA01

After a trial court appointed a receiver in a Harris County family law dispute, the appellant challenged the order in the First Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the court paused (abated) the proceedings to allow the parties to attend mediation. Following a successful mediation where all issues were resolved, the appellant moved to dismiss the appeal. The court analyzed the request under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), which allows for voluntary dismissal upon the appellant's motion. The court held that because a settlement was reached, no live controversy remained; it subsequently reinstated the appeal, granted the dismissal, and disposed of all pending motions as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a receivership or other interlocutory order is used as strategic leverage in a divorce, reaching a global settlement during appellate mediation allows for a clean procedural exit. Parties should use Rule 42.1 to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which ensures the case is closed efficiently and prevents further unnecessary legal expenses."

Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres

COA03

Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal."

Evidence

Murray Lobb, PLLC v. Brandy Liss, Executor for the Estate of Mary James

COA14

In an estate dispute, the executor sued a former law firm for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the firm “switched sides” and harmed the estate by filing and prosecuting litigation for the former joint client and by taking litigation positions attacking an assignment the firm had drafted. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals looked past the fiduciary-duty label and focused on the conduct actually pleaded: court filings, pleadings, and other litigation communications in related judicial proceedings. Because those litigation communications were a “fundamental part/main ingredient” of the alleged wrongdoing, the claims were “based on or in response to” the firm’s exercise of the TCPA-protected right to petition under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(4). The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion (affirming only the sanctions denial), rendered judgment dismissing the claims with prejudice, and remanded for a mandatory award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under TCPA § 27.009(a)(1).

Litigation Takeaway

"If a party repackages complaints about what a lawyer filed, argued, served, or said in a case into a tort claim like “breach of fiduciary duty,” the TCPA may require early dismissal when the litigation communications are a core part of the claim—and dismissal triggers mandatory fee-and-cost shifting. Plead (or attack) the case based on what the petition actually alleges, not the cause-of-action label."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of A.C. and E.C., Jr., Children

COA06

In a termination-of-parental-rights appeal from Gregg County, Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s predicate findings and best-interest determination. The Sixth Court of Appeals (Texarkana) applied the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and the Supreme Court’s modern sufficiency framework, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and reasonable inferences while reviewing the entire record “holistically.” Because endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) have collateral consequences in future cases, the court conducted mandatory review of those challenged grounds and held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to prove (D) (endangering conditions/surroundings) and (E) (endangering conduct/course of conduct). The court also evaluated best interest under § 161.001(b)(2) using the Holley factors as nonexclusive guideposts and held the record supported the best-interest finding as to both parents (including Father, who challenged only best interest). The termination order was affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"Endangerment is proved—and sustained on appeal—through the cumulative story, not a single “bad fact.” If you’re pursuing or defending a termination (or litigating custody restrictions with endangerment themes), build and attack a record that ties specific unsafe conditions and a parent’s course of conduct to the child’s exposure to risk. Also, preserve and litigate grounds (D) and (E) directly: appellate courts must review challenged D/E findings, and those findings can follow a parent into future cases."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Thomas Joseph Radford, Jr. v. The State of Texas

COA01

In Radford, the complainant testified she ingested Xanax supplied by the defendant, lost consciousness, and woke to find the defendant penetrating her while her clothing was displaced. The defendant immediately stopped and acted as if nothing had happened when she opened her eyes. On appeal from a sexual-assault conviction, the Houston First Court of Appeals applied the legal-sufficiency standard (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict) and focused on Texas Penal Code § 22.011(b)(3) and (5), which define “without consent” to include situations where the actor knows the complainant is unconscious/physically unable to resist or unaware the assault is occurring. The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s inability to describe the precise start of intercourse created an evidentiary gap; unconsciousness at the outset is itself affirmative proof of nonconsent under the statute. The court further held the jury could infer the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent from circumstantial evidence and consciousness-of-guilt conduct, including that intercourse began while she was unconscious (after drugs he provided) and that he abruptly stopped and normalized the situation upon her awakening. The court affirmed, holding the evidence legally sufficient to prove both lack of consent and the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent.

Litigation Takeaway

"When the evidence shows a person was unconscious or unaware at the outset, Texas law treats that incapacity as affirmative proof of “without consent”—the case does not fail just because the complainant cannot testify to what happened during unconsciousness. Knowledge/intent is commonly proven circumstantially; abrupt stopping, concealment, minimization, or “acting like nothing happened” can support an inference the actor knew the other person could not consent. In family-violence/SAPCR disputes, build the record around impairment, waking-condition details, and post-incident conduct to support findings even where memory is partial."