Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Ivan Lopez-Lopez v. State, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child where the defendant’s primary appellate argument was that the complainant was not credible because her disclosures became more detailed over time and because the alleged abuse was too frequent to believe. Applying the Jackson/Brooks legal-sufficiency standard, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and refused to reweigh the jury’s credibility determinations. The court held the complainant’s testimony alone can be legally sufficient under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.07, and her testimony established the statutory elements of continuous sexual abuse under Texas Penal Code § 21.02(b) (child under 14, defendant 17 or older, two or more acts over a period of at least 30 days). The court rejected “evolving disclosure” and “too much abuse to be true” themes as credibility attacks for the jury, not grounds to overturn the verdict on appeal, and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Credibility-only challenges rarely win on appeal. A child’s incremental or “evolving” disclosure is treated as common—not inherently suspicious—and a factfinder may credit it. In family cases involving abuse allegations, expect appellate courts to defer to the trial court’s credibility calls; build (or attack) the case with objective, admissible proof and preserve legal-error issues (evidentiary rulings, due-process limits), not just arguments that the witness “wasn’t believable.”"
In re The Commitment of Raul Eliss Dominguez
COA03
In an SVP civil-commitment jury trial under Texas Health & Safety Code Chapter 841, the State’s expert psychologist referenced an unadjudicated allegation that Raul Eliss Dominguez sexually abused his four-year-old nephew. Although the issue was discussed outside the jury’s presence in a pretrial/limine setting, the trial court only cautioned counsel to object if testimony became inadmissible. When the expert mentioned the nephew allegation in front of the jury, Dominguez did not make a timely, specific objection, did not request a running objection, and did not obtain a ruling tied to the complained-of testimony. Applying TRAP 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103, the Third Court of Appeals held the complaint was not preserved and affirmed the commitment order. The court also held that, even assuming the expert’s testimony was admitted in error, any error was harmless (and effectively waived) because Dominguez later introduced the same or similar evidence through his own testimony without objection, triggering the “same evidence” rule.
Litigation Takeaway
"Motions in limine don’t preserve error. If an expert starts weaving unadjudicated “bad act” allegations into the basis for an opinion, you must object in real time, obtain a ruling (and a running objection if it will recur), and avoid later “opening the door” by eliciting the same facts yourself—otherwise you likely lose the issue both on preservation and on harmlessness under the same-evidence rule."
Maria Martinez v. Mario Antonio Perez Batres
COA03
Maria Martinez filed a restricted appeal to challenge a default divorce decree. However, the appellate court discovered that all twelve exhibits admitted during the initial hearing were missing from the record because the trial judge had released the originals to the husband’s lawyer, who never filed them with the district clerk. The Third Court of Appeals analyzed the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that this created a significant 'record-integrity problem' that could not be fixed by simple supplementation. The court held that the appeal must be abated and remanded to the trial court, ordering the trial judge to 'settle the record' by either securing an agreement between the parties or holding a hearing to reconstruct the missing evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning your hearing is only the first step; you must ensure your evidence is officially filed and preserved with the court clerk. If exhibits are 'released' to an attorney rather than filed, it can lead to expensive delays and secondary 'record reconstruction' hearings if the case is ever challenged on appeal."
Oscar Antonio Rodriguez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In a prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the complainant had previously viewed pornography on a relative’s phone to support a fabrication theory. The State invoked former Texas Rule of Evidence 412 (rape-shield rule), and after a hearing outside the jury’s presence the trial court excluded the evidence, finding it did not fit any exception and did not show bias or motive to lie. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that pornography exposure, at most, provides an “alternative source of sexual knowledge,” which does not satisfy Rule 412’s motive/bias exception absent a logical nexus showing why the exposure would lead the complainant to falsely accuse this defendant. The court also held any constitutional “right to present a defense” complaint was waived because the defense did not expressly raise that constitutional ground in the trial court and obtain a ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"Porn/sexual-content exposure is not automatically admissible to undermine a child-complainant; without a concrete, non-speculative link to a specific motive or bias to fabricate against the accused, it is simply an alternative-knowledge theory and can be excluded under rape-shield/Rule 403 principles. Also, if you intend to argue evidence is “constitutionally required” (due process/confrontation/right to present a defense), you must clearly assert that ground, make a full offer of proof, and obtain an express ruling—or the issue is waived on appeal."
Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV
COA14
In Norman v. Kahn Scheepvaart BV, a longshore worker appealed a take-nothing judgment after a jury found neither she nor the vessel owner’s negligence proximately caused her injury. On appeal, she attacked the jury charge as confusing and as improperly permitting certain theories/defenses and a “no one responsible” outcome, and she also sought a new trial based on alleged juror and bailiff misconduct. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on error preservation under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 272–278 and the State Dep’t of Highways v. Payne framework, holding that most complaints were waived because counsel did not make timely, specific objections at the charge conference, did not ensure any requested charge language was in the clerk’s record in substantially correct form, and did not obtain an express ruling or endorsed refusal. The court rejected “preservation-by-paperwork,” explaining that pretrial filings and an unrecorded “tender” did not alert the trial court at the charge conference or create an appellate record under Cruz. The court declined to treat the alleged defects as fundamental error. As to the few issues arguably preserved, the court found no reversible charge error (one was not error; any other assumed error was harmless). The court also held the alleged juror/bailiff misconduct did not justify a new trial and affirmed the denial of the motion for new trial. The take-nothing judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jury-charge complaints live or die on preservation: object on the record before submission, state the defect plainly and specifically, tender substantially correct requested language, make sure it is file-stamped and included in the clerk’s record, and get a clear ruling/refusal. Pretrial proposed charges and vague “tenders” that don’t make it into the record won’t save an appeal, and misconduct/new-trial arguments require admissible proof tied to harm."
Rickye Henderson v. Ali Arabzadegan
COA03
In a quiet-title/deed-fraud lawsuit, the defendant repeatedly obstructed discovery—producing no responsive documents, asserting meritless objections, giving inconsistent explanations about missing devices/accounts, and refusing to comply with a court-ordered forensic imaging protocol designed to obtain electronically stored information (ESI) and test suspected fabrication. After incremental discovery orders and express findings of intentional concealment and repeated noncompliance, the trial court imposed “death-penalty” sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215 by striking pleadings/defaulting the defendant on liability, leaving only damages for a bench prove-up. The defendant then failed to appear for the damages trial, and the court rendered judgment quieting title, declaring the deed void, and awarding damages and attorneys’ fees. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held the sanctions were “just,” directly related to the discovery abuse, and consistent with due process; it also rejected complaints that excluded evidence (including purported newly discovered racially offensive emails) required reversal in a post-default posture, and affirmed an interlocutory summary judgment disposing of the defendant’s breach-of-contract counterclaim.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can and will strike pleadings and default a party who games ESI discovery—especially when a tailored forensic imaging order (with privilege safeguards) is ignored. Build a careful record of repeated noncompliance, prejudice, and the ineffectiveness of lesser measures; on appeal, due-process and “critical evidence” arguments are unlikely to resurrect liability after a sanctions default, and the case may proceed only on damages (if the sanctioned party even shows up)."
Sergio Adrian Contreras v. The State of Texas
COA13
In a criminal appeal arising from a continuous sexual abuse of a child conviction under Texas Penal Code § 21.02, the defendant challenged (1) alleged jury-charge error, (2) legal sufficiency on the statute’s “continuous period of 30 or more days”/multiple-acts element, (3) limits the trial court placed on voir dire of venire members with sexual-assault experiences, and (4) claimed prosecutorial misconduct. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the charge complaints under Texas jury-charge harm standards (including the egregious-harm framework for unpreserved error), reviewed sufficiency under the Jackson v. Virginia rational-juror standard, and deferred to the trial court’s broad discretion to control voir dire absent a showing that limits prevented meaningful bias exploration and caused harm. On the evidence, the court treated the State’s proof as a corroborative disclosure pathway—school counselor/wellness disclosure leading to CAC forensic interviews and a child-abuse pediatric evaluation—and held that delayed outcry, developmental “fuzziness,” and qualifying language (“I think,” “I’m not sure”) did not render the children’s accounts legally insufficient. The court also found no reversible prosecutorial-misconduct error due to context, lack of preservation, curative measures, or lack of prejudice. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence/child-sex-abuse custody and protective-order cases, courts can credit a “disclosure pathway” (school disclosure → CAC interview → medical/clinical testimony) even when the child reports late and is imprecise on details; don’t assume “I’m not sure” impeachment will defeat safety findings. If you’re defending, focus on challenging the reliability of the disclosure process (suggestibility/contamination, anchoring, leading questions) and preserve a clean record—especially for voir dire and evidentiary limits—because appellate courts give wide deference without specific offers of proof."
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.”"
Skorich v. State; Woody v. State
COA07
During an interstate trucking trip, a seven-year-old arrived at a Hereford, Texas ER unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered in bruises. The mother and her non-parent boyfriend were convicted of injury to a child based on a course of conduct that included chronic water deprivation, corporal punishment, and delayed medical care. On appeal, they challenged Texas subject-matter jurisdiction and Deaf Smith County venue because much of the travel occurred outside Texas, and the boyfriend challenged the legal sufficiency of proof that he had a duty to act (required for omission liability under Penal Code § 22.04). The Seventh Court of Appeals treated the events as a continuing, mobile criminal episode and held Texas had jurisdiction because the State tied critical elements and the resulting serious bodily injury to Texas, including the child’s deterioration and medical crisis culminating in Texas. The court further held venue was proper in Deaf Smith County because the evidence connected the offense to that county, including the child’s emergent presentation and treatment in Hereford and supporting timeline/location proof. On the merits, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient that the boyfriend assumed “care, custody, and control” through cohabitation/household integration, discipline authority, shared finances, and influence over medical decisions—creating a legal duty supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient that the mother knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission through chronic deprivation of water and failure to obtain timely medical care, and it affirmed both convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and protective-order litigation, a parent’s live-in romantic partner can be treated as a de facto caregiver with enforceable duties when the facts show they functioned in the family unit (discipline, daily supervision, finances, medical decision-making). Also, “neglect” theories (withholding basic necessities and delaying medical care) can support endangerment and family-violence findings as an omission-based course of conduct—especially in mobile-family cases—so anchor proof to where the child’s decline manifested and where the crisis was discovered/treated to defeat jurisdiction/venue attacks."