Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In a Collin County family law case, a father sought mandamus relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals, challenging a denied motion for continuance and the alleged removal of a recusal motion from the docket. The court analyzed the petition under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l) and 52.7, which require the person seeking relief to provide a record containing certified or sworn copies of all material documents. The court held that because the relator failed to provide an authenticated and complete record, he did not meet his burden of proof, and the court denied the petition without reaching the underlying merits of the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules for appeals are not just technicalities; they are the gateway to relief. Even if a trial court's order is arguably 'void' or unfair, an appellate court will not intervene unless you provide a properly authenticated and complete record of the proceedings."
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
Claudia Lucius Williams Smith v. Kenneth Wayne Allen
COA14
In this heirship dispute, the court addressed whether a Harris County home purchased in 1972 was separate or community property. The resolution turned on whether the decedent, Lossie Mae Smith, was informally married to Tom Willie Smith at the time of purchase. The trial court found no informal marriage existed in 1972, pointing to a deed identifying Lossie as a single woman ("feme sole") and testimony from siblings that Tom was not in her life at that time. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that because a key letter supporting the marriage claim was never formally admitted into evidence—only placed in the court file—it lacked probative weight. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the separate-property characterization.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence that is merely 'in the court file' is not the same as evidence admitted at trial. To prove an informal marriage or challenge property characterization, you must formally admit your documents into evidence and preserve all procedural objections—such as concerns about legal representation or notice—at the trial level, or you risk losing your right to appeal those issues."
In re John F. Ross
COA05
In an ongoing Collin County divorce case, the husband sought mandamus relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals on an emergency basis the day before a scheduled hearing. He asked the court to stay the next-day hearing, set aside a January 13, 2026 “final decree of divorce,” return a January 12, 2026 motion to recuse to the trial court’s docket, and compel discovery. The court did not analyze whether those complaints met the mandamus standards (clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal) because the mandamus petition and record were procedurally deficient. Citing mandatory original-proceeding requirements under TRAP 52.3(k) (certification), 52.3(l)(1)(B) (appendix requirements), and 52.7(a) (mandamus record), and relying on prior Dallas cases enforcing those rules, the court held that TRAP 52 compliance is a gateway to merits review. Because the relator failed to comply in “numerous respects,” the court denied mandamus without reaching the merits and denied the emergency stay motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law mandamus practice, TRAP 52 compliance is not optional—it is the ticket to get the court to consider your complaint. A missing/defective certification, appendix, or complete authenticated record can trigger a flat denial (even with a hearing the next day), and a stay request will fail with the petition."
City of Houston v. Sancelia Fonteneaux
COA14
A plaintiff sued the City of Houston (and METRO) for negligence after a bus door allegedly closed on her arm while she was boarding. The City sought dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing the pleadings showed no Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) motor‑vehicle waiver because the bus was operated by METRO, a separate entity, not a City employee. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Rule 91a’s pleading-only framework—accepting the petition’s facts as true, liberally construing them, and drawing reasonable inferences—and held the live petition plausibly alleged the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(1) by alleging the injury arose from the operation/use of a motor vehicle and, alternatively, that the bus was owned/operated/maintained and/or driven by the City (or METRO), permitting an inference at the pleading stage that a City employee acting within scope could have operated the bus. The court also refused the City’s request to render judgment based on its pending traditional summary-judgment motion because the trial court had not ruled and Rule 91a does not allow evidence-based, “backdoor summary judgment” review. The denial of the Rule 91a motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 91a is not a shortcut to win an immunity or “wrong entity” fight on disputed facts. If the petition pleads a concrete motor-vehicle injury mechanism and plausibly ties operation of the vehicle to a governmental unit—even in the alternative—the case will usually survive early dismissal and move into discovery; defendants should use evidence-based tools (plea to the jurisdiction/summary judgment) rather than a pleading-only Rule 91a attack."
In the Interest of M.L. and E.L., Children
COA11
In a CPS termination appeal involving repeated cocaine use and newborn/child drug exposure, the Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for multiple pleaded predicate grounds under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)—endangering conditions/surroundings (D), endangering conduct (E), prior termination based on (D)/(E) (M), and “born addicted” (Q)—and for best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The record showed multiple positive drug tests by Mother and at least one child, removals of two children, and later relapse while pregnant; but it also showed substantial rehabilitation (counseling, medication management, completion of outpatient treatment, and sustained negative tests) and a Department-supported monitored return that later failed due to the live-in partner’s marijuana-positive test rather than Mother’s. Applying the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for termination, the court conducted a ground-by-ground audit, requiring a tight evidentiary fit between the statutory elements and the proof rather than relying on a generalized “drug case” narrative. The court therefore affirmed the termination order in part, but reversed and remanded in part because one or more of the challenged statutory grounds and/or related findings (including best-interest as tied to those grounds) were not supported by clear and convincing evidence on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in strong drug-exposure cases, appellate courts will scrutinize each termination ground separately—so build an element-by-element record. If a third party’s drug use is the trigger (e.g., during a monitored return), prove the parent’s knowledge and protective capacity (or, for the defense, document prompt removal and safety measures). And if you plead “born addicted” under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), you must prove addiction/withdrawal with medical precision—not just exposure or suspicion."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."
In re Francisco Gibran Morales
COA13
In an original proceeding arising from a child possession dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief to force the trial court to sign a written order that he claimed should have memorialized an alleged oral August 30, 2024 possession-modification ruling. He also challenged later possession-related enforcement/interim orders—including writs of attachment and an interim possession order—arguing the court relied on the wrong “controlling” possession order and issued relief without an evidentiary hearing. Applying Texas’s two-part mandamus standard, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals emphasized that mandamus is extraordinary and requires a record showing (1) a clear abuse of discretion or failure to perform a purely ministerial duty and (2) no adequate remedy by appeal. Because the mandamus record did not conclusively establish a ministerial duty to sign the specific proposed written order (i.e., a definite, rendered oral ruling that the proposed order accurately reflected), nor did it demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion or why ordinary appellate remedies were inadequate as to the interim/enforcement orders, the court denied mandamus and lifted its prior stay.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus won’t fix an unclear or incomplete possession record. If you want extraordinary relief in a possession-modification/enforcement fight, you must (1) prove on a clean mandamus record that a specific, definite ruling was actually rendered and that signing a particular written order is ministerial, and (2) explain concretely why appeal is inadequate—especially when attacking interim possession or attachment/enforcement orders."
Hendrickson v. State
COA10
In an indecency-with-a-child prosecution, the State called the child’s treating counselor, an LPC-Associate, to testify that she diagnosed the child with PTSD using the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and to explain treatment goals. The defense objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, arguing the associate lacked the training/experience allegedly required by 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 681.43 to administer and interpret the CATS, and also objected that the testimony would improperly “bolster” the child’s testimony. The Waco Court of Appeals applied the Rule 702/Vela framework and abuse-of-discretion review, holding the record supported the trial court’s gatekeeping decision: the witness testified she learned the CATS in graduate school, received continuing training, and routinely used the tool with many patients, which was enough for the trial court to reasonably find qualification and reliability (within the “zone of reasonable disagreement”). The court also rejected the “bolstering” complaint because “bolstering” is an ambiguous objection and the trial objection did not clearly invoke a specific evidentiary rule or match the more developed arguments raised on appeal, so error was not preserved under TRAP 33.1/comportment principles.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family cases involving child-trauma/PTSD opinions, licensure level alone (e.g., LPC-Associate vs. psychologist) is not dispositive under Rule 702—what matters is a record showing tool-specific training and repeated, competent use. If you are opposing the testimony, do not rely on a generic “bolstering” objection; pin the challenge to a конкрет rule and theory (Rule 702 qualification/reliability/fit, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, or hearsay/conduit limits) and preserve it with a clear, matching objection and ruling."
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."