Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Skorich v. State; Woody v. State
COA07
During an interstate trucking trip, a seven-year-old arrived at a Hereford, Texas ER unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered in bruises. The mother and her non-parent boyfriend were convicted of injury to a child based on a course of conduct that included chronic water deprivation, corporal punishment, and delayed medical care. On appeal, they challenged Texas subject-matter jurisdiction and Deaf Smith County venue because much of the travel occurred outside Texas, and the boyfriend challenged the legal sufficiency of proof that he had a duty to act (required for omission liability under Penal Code § 22.04). The Seventh Court of Appeals treated the events as a continuing, mobile criminal episode and held Texas had jurisdiction because the State tied critical elements and the resulting serious bodily injury to Texas, including the child’s deterioration and medical crisis culminating in Texas. The court further held venue was proper in Deaf Smith County because the evidence connected the offense to that county, including the child’s emergent presentation and treatment in Hereford and supporting timeline/location proof. On the merits, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient that the boyfriend assumed “care, custody, and control” through cohabitation/household integration, discipline authority, shared finances, and influence over medical decisions—creating a legal duty supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient that the mother knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission through chronic deprivation of water and failure to obtain timely medical care, and it affirmed both convictions.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and protective-order litigation, a parent’s live-in romantic partner can be treated as a de facto caregiver with enforceable duties when the facts show they functioned in the family unit (discipline, daily supervision, finances, medical decision-making). Also, “neglect” theories (withholding basic necessities and delaying medical care) can support endangerment and family-violence findings as an omission-based course of conduct—especially in mobile-family cases—so anchor proof to where the child’s decline manifested and where the crisis was discovered/treated to defeat jurisdiction/venue attacks."
In the Interest of O.E.S., a Child
COA05
In a child support dispute under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), a father appealed a trial court's refusal to vacate a support order issued following a previous remand. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that the father waived most of his appellate points by failing to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). His brief lacked specific citations to the record and coherent legal analysis, which the court held is fatal to an appeal regardless of whether a party is represented by an attorney. Additionally, the court applied the 'law of the case' doctrine to reject his jurisdictional challenge, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had already been settled in a prior appeal of the same litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Procedural rules are just as important as the facts of your case; failing to properly cite the record or provide a clear legal argument in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of your claims. Furthermore, once a legal issue like jurisdiction is decided by an appellate court, the 'law of the case' doctrine typically prevents you from re-litigating that same issue later in the same proceeding."
Mosser v. Flagstar Bank, FSB; Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.; First Guaranty Mortgage Corporation; Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
COA05
In a Texas homestead lending/foreclosure dispute, the borrower challenged a home-equity (“cash-out”) lien as constitutionally noncompliant and void and sought discovery from multiple entities in the loan/servicing chain. Defendants moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. The borrower filed a properly supported Rule 166a(g) motion for continuance explaining he needed basic, targeted discovery—foundational documents and testimony necessary to respond to the dispositive motions—especially after later-joined parties and procedural events effectively limited meaningful discovery time. The trial court denied the continuance and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals first rejected a post-submission jurisdiction/standing attack tied to a later-recorded “corrective” assignment, holding it still had appellate jurisdiction and that any assignment/standing issues could be addressed on remand. Turning to the merits, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 166a(g) continuance where the record showed the requested discovery was essential—not a fishing expedition—to oppose summary judgment. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court can’t force a party to lose on summary judgment while blocking the minimum discovery needed to respond. If you face early dispositive motions in a property-heavy case, preserve error with a verified, nonconclusory Rule 166a(g) continuance request that ties specific discovery to specific summary-judgment elements and demonstrates diligence—especially when key parties were added late or discovery time was functionally curtailed."
Christopher Redin v. The State of Texas
COA06
In a criminal dating‑violence assault-by-occlusion trial, the defendant sought to keep out evidence that he had assaulted other dating partners in California and moved for mistrial when witnesses briefly referenced an “open case” and “similar charges” despite a motion in limine. The trial court held a pretrial hearing, deferred its final ruling, then—after the defense’s cross-examination created a misleading “false impression” about the defendant’s behavior and the nature of the incident—admitted the other-victim testimony as rebuttal evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), subject to Rule 403 balancing. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion: the extraneous assaults were admitted for a permissible non-character purpose (rebutting a false impression and providing context on disputed issues) and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also affirmed denial of mistrial, concluding the brief references to an “open case”/“similar charges” were not so prejudicial as to be incurable and limine violations alone did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In protective-order and SAPCR trials, “character” themes can backfire. If your cross-examination suggests the violence was isolated, the applicant is exaggerating, or the respondent is “not that kind of person,” you may open the door to prior-partner abuse evidence under Rule 404(b) as rebuttal to a false impression—often surviving Rule 403. Also, a motion in limine is only a speed bump: be ready to object, move to strike, request an instruction, and build a record showing why any mention of other cases is incurable if you want a mistrial."
Texas A&M University–Commerce and Texas A&M University System v. Chandler Donaway
COA05
A student-athlete sued university entities and others for alleged negligent athletic training and delayed/improper medical treatment after an ankle injury, asserting health care liability claims that required a Texas Chapter 74 expert report. The trial court overruled the universities’ objections and denied their partial motion to dismiss, but on interlocutory appeal the Dallas Court of Appeals strictly applied § 74.351 and the Palacios/Bowie/Jelinek line, emphasizing the “four corners” rule and that “good faith” is an objective sufficiency test. Because the plaintiff’s expert report did not state defendant-specific standards of care, identify what each university entity did or failed to do that breached those standards, or provide a nonconclusory causal chain linking those breaches to the complained-of injuries, it was not an “objective good-faith effort.” The court reversed the order overruling objections/denying dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Conclusory medical-causation narratives don’t survive early gatekeeping: whether you’re attacking or offering expert proof, make it actor-specific and element-by-element—(1) the applicable standard/benchmark, (2) the specific deviation by that party, and (3) a reasoned, non-inferential causal chain. If the court has to “fill gaps” to connect the dots, the report (or letter/affidavit) is vulnerable to being struck or dismissed."
Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas
COA07
In a consolidated criminal appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reviewed injury-to-a-child convictions against the child’s mother and her live-in boyfriend arising from omissions during an interstate 18‑wheeler trip that culminated with the seven-year-old arriving at a Hereford (Deaf Smith County) ER unresponsive, severely dehydrated, and bruised. The defendants challenged (1) subject-matter jurisdiction and venue in Deaf Smith County given the multistate travel, and (2) legal and factual sufficiency—especially whether the boyfriend could be liable by omission absent parent status. Applying Texas Penal Code § 22.04, the court treated the conduct as a continuing, omission-based course of conduct with a harmful result tied to Deaf Smith County, and held Texas courts had jurisdiction and venue was proper where key components of the omission and the resulting medical crisis manifested. On sufficiency, the court held the evidence supported that the boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—shown by cohabitation, day-to-day authority and discipline, integrated household functioning, and participation in decisions about when to seek medical care—creating a legal duty to act and supporting omission liability. The court also held the evidence supported the mother’s knowing or reckless mental state and causation, relying heavily on medical testimony that the child’s dehydration was chronic and consistent with withholding fluids and delayed care. The court affirmed both defendants’ judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, a live-in boyfriend/girlfriend can become a duty-bearing “assumed caregiver” based on real-world control and decision-making—enough to support omission liability. For SAPCRs and protective orders, build (or attack) proof around functional caregiving facts (cohabitation, discipline, control of necessities, medical decision-making, admissions) and a clear timeline showing progressive deterioration and delayed intervention; courts will look past labels like “not the parent.”"
In the Interest of D.R.S., a Child
COA07
In a parental-rights termination appeal, the parent’s appointed appellate counsel sought to withdraw after briefing due to a newly arising, irreconcilable conflict of interest caused by new employment. Recognizing that termination appeals are accelerated and implicate the parent’s right to effective representation, the Seventh Court of Appeals held it could not proceed on the merits without a trial-court ruling and an adequate record regarding the conflict and any need for substitute counsel. The court therefore abated the appeal, suspended appellate deadlines, and remanded to the trial court to rule on withdrawal, decide whether substitute appellate counsel must be appointed, and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, with a supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s record due by a set expedited deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law appeals—especially parental-termination cases—an attorney conflict is a threshold issue that can halt the appeal. Raise conflicts immediately and build a clear trial-court record (order, findings, and hearing record) on withdrawal and substitution, or the appellate court may abate the case and suspend deadlines until representation issues are resolved."
C. R. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In a bench-trial termination case, the mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting endangerment grounds and the best-interest finding after she led police on a late-night, 100+ mph chase with her three young children in the car and the Department removed the children. The Third Court of Appeals evaluated the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and viewed the evidence cumulatively, not as a single-incident lapse. It held that the high-speed flight, combined with the children’s unstable living conditions (sleeping and eating in the car, poor hygiene and inadequate clothing), outstanding felony warrants (including custodial interference), and unresolved mental-health/substance-use concerns supported findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (endangering conditions) and (E) (endangering conduct). Applying the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized the children’s stability and improvement in a Kentucky placement, concerns that the mother’s hostile communications destabilized the placement and the children, and the mother’s failure to document sobriety/treatment after moving out of state. The court affirmed termination, upheld the finding that the Department made reasonable reunification efforts despite the mother’s relocation, and affirmed appointment of the Department as permanent managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"High-risk conduct that exposes children to danger—even without physical injury—can support termination and heavily influence custody outcomes, especially when paired with instability, unresolved mental-health/substance issues, and combative communications that harm the children’s emotional stability. If a parent moves out of state during a CPS/SAPCR case, they must proactively secure admissible proof of service completion and sobriety; courts will not treat the move as shifting the agency’s duty to fund or arrange out-of-state services."
In re M.S.
COA02
In a modification of a Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship (SAPCR) between a mother and a nonparent former partner, the trial court initially maintained the nonparent's joint managing conservatorship and possession rights over the mother’s objection. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the "fit-parent presumption" established in In re C.J.C., held that a trial court cannot grant or continue a nonparent's possession or conservatorship rights over a fit parent's objection without evidence of extraordinary circumstances or parental unfitness. Finding that the record consisted primarily of interpersonal conflict rather than evidence of significant harm to the child, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and ordered the trial court to vacate its orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary orders are a critical constitutional battleground in parent-vs-nonparent disputes. Litigators must treat the "fit-parent presumption" as the controlling standard from the outset; a nonparent cannot rely on the "status quo" or "best interest" alone to maintain rights, but must instead prove extraordinary circumstances to overcome a fit parent's objection."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA05
In a juvenile delinquency jury trial for indecency with a child by contact, jurors reported that a State investigator seated in the gallery as the child complainant’s “support” repeatedly used gestures (e.g., “thumbs up,” motions to look at him, refocusing cues) that functionally coached the child during live testimony. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed the conduct as State-sponsored interference with the juvenile’s right to confrontation and meaningful cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment and Texas Constitution art. I, § 10, emphasizing that confrontation protects not just physical presence but an opportunity to test credibility free from real-time outside shaping. Applying constitutional harm review, the court held the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the child’s testimony was central and credibility-driven, and the jury’s evaluation was tainted by observed prompting from a State agent. The court reversed the adjudication and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a child witness is testifying, a “support person” cannot become a coach. If any aligned adult is visible to the child and signals, gestures, or otherwise prompts answers during testimony, object and demand an immediate inquiry; build a record (including juror/counsel affidavits if discovered later) and seek striking testimony, mistrial/new trial, or appellate reversal. In family cases, use the same due-process/credibility framework to challenge the reliability of child testimony or statements and to request prophylactic courtroom controls (neutral support, no line-of-sight, no signaling, on-the-record admonishments)."