Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Brandon Keith Anderson v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this case, a witness provided surprise testimony during a hearing involving prejudicial information that had not been disclosed during discovery. Although the defendant successfully moved the trial court to disregard the testimony, he did not specifically move for a mistrial. On appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the 'preservation ladder,' which generally requires a party to object, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial to preserve error. The court held that because the appellant received the exact relief he requested (disregarding the testimony) and failed to seek a mistrial or obtain an adverse ruling, the complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Winning a motion to strike or disregard surprise testimony is a 'trap' if the evidence is truly 'incurable.' In Texas courts, if a witness drops a 'bombshell' that poisons the well, you must move for a mistrial and secure an adverse ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. Merely asking the judge to disregard the statement is considered a 'win' at trial that results in a procedural default on appeal, leaving you with no recourse if the judge is ultimately influenced by the excluded evidence."
Dingler v. The State of Texas
COA02
In a plea-bargain drug case, Joseph Kelly Dingler signed the trial court’s certification stating it was a plea-bargain case and that he had “NO right of appeal,” but he nevertheless filed a notice of appeal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed the record as required and, after giving Dingler notice and an opportunity to show why the appeal should continue, received no response. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d) (and related dismissal authority under TRAP 43.2(f) and defect-cure procedure under TRAP 44.3), and consistent with Chavez v. State, the court held the certification controlled and it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other party’s criminal case ends in a plea bargain with a signed “no right of appeal” certification, the conviction is effectively insulated from appeal-driven delay—use that procedural finality in your custody/divorce case to push forward (e.g., oppose abatement/stays, support endangerment/best-interest arguments, and seek temporary or final relief without waiting on a criminal appeal that cannot proceed)."
Dennis Maurice Jones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Jones v. State, the defendant sought to introduce his mother’s testimony about his mental-health history during an aggravated-assault trial. When the State objected on relevance, defense counsel expressly told the trial court the testimony was offered only to support an insanity defense and “not attempting to get any sort of lesser included reckless charge.” The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, Jones argued the exclusion was error because the evidence would have supported a lesser-included offense instruction. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the “matching” preservation doctrine (Clark v. State), holding the appellate complaint did not match what was requested at trial. Because counsel affirmatively disclaimed the lesser-included theory, the trial court was never asked to rule on admissibility for that purpose and there was no preserved error to review. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not “narrow-proffer” yourself into an appellate waiver. If evidence is relevant to multiple theories (e.g., best interest, statutory presumptions, significant impairment, danger), state all applicable grounds and avoid affirmative disclaimers like “not for X.” Appellate courts will hold you to the exact theory presented to the trial judge, and a trial-level disclaimer can permanently foreclose a later appeal."
Michael Damone Jones v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Jones v. State, the Twelfth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could legally assess attorney's fees as court costs against a defendant who had already been declared indigent. The court analyzed Texas statutes requiring that once indigency is established, it is presumed to continue unless the record shows a 'material change' in the individual's financial circumstances. Finding that the record contained no evidence of financial improvement, the appellate court held the fee assessment was improper and modified the judgment to strike the $300 in attorney's fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you have been declared indigent by the court (such as through a Rule 145 Statement), you are protected from being ordered to pay attorney's fees or court costs unless the opposing party can prove a significant improvement in your financial situation."
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal."
John C. Campbell v. Medical Imaging Consultants, LLP
COA12
John Campbell, a radiologist, sued his former employer for breaching a non-disparagement clause in their separation agreement after he was passed over for a job at a different medical group. Campbell alleged that a negative comment regarding his "personality issues" from a former partner caused him to lose the position. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment against Campbell, ruling that he failed to prove causation. The court found that Campbell's theory relied on "inference stacking"—the speculative assumption that he would have successfully completed a multi-step interview process and received a unanimous hiring vote but for the alleged disparagement.
Litigation Takeaway
"To recover damages for the breach of a non-disparagement clause, it is not enough to prove a negative comment was made; you must provide direct evidence that the disparagement was the 'but-for' cause of a lost job or contract, rather than relying on a chain of speculative inferences about a third party's hiring process."
In the matter of D.P.
COA02
In this juvenile law matter, the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old, D.P., to adult criminal court for prosecution of capital murder and aggravated robbery. D.P. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause and argued that the trial court improperly weighed his maturity and sophistication. The appellate court affirmed the transfer, holding that the State met its burden through detective testimony and physical evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court acted within its discretion under Texas Family Code § 54.02 by identifying D.P.'s 'level of planning' and premeditation as clear indicators of adult-like sophistication, which outweighed his lack of a prior criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When litigating a minor’s maturity or capacity—whether in juvenile transfer hearings or high-conflict custody disputes involving delinquent behavior—Texas courts prioritize evidence of 'planning' and 'organization' over a lack of prior history to determine if a child should be held to adult-level standards of accountability."
In re Hector Hernandez
COA08
After obtaining a writ of execution to recover property, Hector Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the El Paso Court of Appeals because the County Sheriff refused to enforce the writ. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which limits its original mandamus jurisdiction to actions against specific judges, not executive officials like sheriffs. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to act unless such an order was necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. Because Hernandez had not first filed a mandamus action against the sheriff in a district court, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot "leapfrog" the trial court when a sheriff or constable refuses to execute a writ. To compel a county official to perform a ministerial duty, you must first file a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court; filing directly in the court of appeals will result in a jurisdictional dismissal."
P. J. S., Appellant v. K. S. S., Appellee
COA03
In P. J. S. v. K. S. S., a former husband challenged a summary judgment requiring him to pay a 'Guaranteed Amount' shortfall to his ex-wife as outlined in their Partition Agreement Incident to Divorce (PAID). The husband argued that because his payments were 'subject to' and secondary to a bank's priority debt, he was not obligated to pay if business profits were insufficient. The Third Court of Appeals disagreed, analyzing the contract language to find that 'subject to' established an order of distribution (who gets paid first) rather than a condition precedent (whether he has to pay at all). Because the agreement lacked specific conditional wording like 'if and only if,' the court held the husband was personally liable for the shortfall regardless of the business's net profits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas, 'subject to' language in a settlement agreement typically establishes payment priority rather than excusing the debt entirely; if a payor intends to limit their liability to available business profits, the agreement must use express conditional language or explicitly disclaim personal liability for shortfalls."
Hallas v. Hallas
COA03
In this divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's failure to provide mandatory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding property division and attorney's fees. The appellant, Janice Hallas, had strictly followed procedural rules by filing both an initial request and a notice of past due findings. The appellate court analyzed the "presumed harm" doctrine, noting that missing findings force an appellant to challenge every conceivable basis for a ruling rather than narrowing the issues. Because the trial court’s silence prevented the appellant from properly presenting her case, the court held the error was harmful, abated the appeal, and remanded the case for the entry of findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Success on appeal often depends on procedural discipline. If a trial court ignores a request for Findings of Fact, you must file a "Notice of Past Due Findings" within the strict 30-day window to preserve your rights. Without these findings, the appellate court will presume the trial judge found every fact necessary to support the original ruling, making it nearly impossible to overturn a discretionary property division."