Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
Curtis Lilly v. Kimberly Thompson
COA02
In Lilly v. Thompson, appellant Curtis Lilly sought to appeal a judgment from the 360th District Court, but the Tarrant County District Clerk notified the appellate court that payment for the clerk’s record had not been made. The Second Court of Appeals issued a warning and granted an extension of time for the appellant to comply. After the appellant failed to meet the extended deadline or provide proof of payment arrangements, the court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 37.3(b) and 42.3(b). The court held that the appellant's persistent failure to manage the administrative costs of the appeal required dismissal for want of prosecution, effectively terminating the appeal before it could be heard on its merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Filing a notice of appeal is only the first step; an appeal will be dismissed regardless of its merits if the appellant fails to pay the administrative fees for the trial court record. Diligent management of court costs and deadlines is a non-negotiable requirement for seeking appellate review in family law cases."
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the defendant challenged (among other issues) the court costs assessed after his convictions, arguing that the district clerk’s bill of costs conflicted with the trial court’s oral pronouncement that costs would not be payable until his release from TDCJ confinement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Richardson’s ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland, but addressed the costs dispute by applying the rule that when a written judgment or ministerial clerk cost bill conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement made in the defendant’s presence, the oral pronouncement controls. The court also reviewed the bill of costs for record support and found a $55 subpoena service fee was unsupported. The court affirmed the convictions, modified the judgment to delete the unsupported subpoena fee, and further modified the judgment/bill of costs to state that court costs are not payable until Richardson is released from confinement, consistent with the trial court’s oral ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"In enforcement and contempt cases—especially when someone is jailed—don’t let boilerplate orders or an auto-generated clerk bill of costs undo what the judge said on the record. If the court orally waives or defers fees/costs, ensure the written order and commitment match; otherwise move to correct/modify because the oral pronouncement controls and unsupported cost items can be struck."
Jonathan Humber v. City of Palestine
COA12
In Humber v. City of Palestine, the appellant filed a motion for new trial 32 days after the trial court signed the final judgment. The appellant later filed a notice of appeal nearly three months after the judgment, assuming the post-judgment motion had extended the appellate deadline. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, which requires a "timely" post-judgment motion to extend the filing deadline for a notice of appeal from 30 to 90 days. The court held that an untimely motion for new trial is a nullity for purposes of the appellate timetable and does not extend the court's jurisdiction, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days of the date the judge signs the order to extend the appellate deadline; filing even one day late means your notice of appeal remains due 30 days from the judgment, potentially terminating your right to appeal."
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed."
Espinoza v. State
COA02
In Espinoza v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty under a negotiated “charge-bargain” in which the State dismissed multiple counts in exchange for guilty pleas to two counts. As part of the bargain, he executed a written waiver of the right to appeal, and the trial court’s Rule 25.2(d) certification reflected that it was a plea-bargain case with no right of appeal. Espinoza nevertheless filed a notice of appeal. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) and (d), and relying on Harper v. State recognizing a charge bargain as a plea bargain that triggers Rule 25.2’s appeal restrictions, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction because the record contained an accurate certification showing no right of appeal and there was no permission to appeal or preserved pretrial motion issue. The court dismissed the appeal under Rule 43.2(f).
Litigation Takeaway
"A negotiated criminal “charge-bargain” that includes a written waiver of appeal can make the conviction immediately final for practical purposes—eliminating “appeal limbo.” In family-law crossover cases, that finality can speed fault-based divorce theories tied to a felony conviction and strengthen custody/property arguments by removing uncertainty about whether the conviction will be overturned."
Opinion by Justice Triana
COA03
In this case, a grandfather sought sole managing conservatorship of his three grandchildren following the death of their father, citing the mother's extreme and abusive disciplinary measures. The mother argued that her 'strict' parenting was protected by the legal 'parental presumption,' which usually favors keeping children with their parents. However, the court analyzed evidence showing the mother forced the children to stay outdoors overnight in freezing temperatures and neglected their medical and psychological needs, leading to fainting spells and suicidal ideation. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the grandfather successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the mother’s conduct posed a significant threat to the children’s physical health and emotional development.
Litigation Takeaway
"The 'parental presumption' is not absolute; a non-parent can win custody by documenting a clear pattern of extreme disciplinary tactics, medical neglect, and the resulting psychological trauma to the children."
In the Matter of B.T.
COA02
In In the Matter of B.T., the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile court's order transferring a young man to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to finish an eighteen-year murder sentence. While the court found that the transfer was required by law because the respondent could not complete his minimum confinement before turning nineteen, it identified an error regarding court costs. The appellate court held that because the respondent had been declared indigent, that status was presumed to continue through the appeal. Consequently, the court affirmed the prison transfer but modified the judgment to strike all assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a party's indigent status is established under the Family Code, it is legally presumed to continue throughout the litigation; attorneys should always audit final judgments and bills of costs to ensure clerks do not improperly assess fees against indigent clients."
IN THE INTEREST OF T.F., A CHILD
COA02
In this case, a father appealed the termination of his parental rights. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review of the record, there were no valid legal grounds for an appeal, and simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel. The Second Court of Appeals performed its own independent review of the record and agreed that the appeal was frivolous, affirming the trial court's termination order. However, the court denied the attorney's motion to withdraw. Applying the Texas Supreme Court's standard from In re P.M., the court held that an appointed attorney’s duty in a termination case continues through the filing of a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, and the mere fact that an appeal is frivolous does not constitute 'good cause' to allow an attorney to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney’s obligation to their client is extensive; filing an Anders brief due to a lack of merit does not automatically permit the attorney to withdraw. Counsel must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court stage unless they can demonstrate specific 'good cause'—such as a conflict of interest—that is independent of the appeal's lack of merit."
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim and challenges to court costs. The appellant argued trial counsel made specific mistakes (e.g., failing to object or pursue certain defensive theories), but the court analyzed counsel’s performance under Strickland by looking at the “totality of representation” rather than isolated alleged errors. Because the record reflected an active, strategic defense—particularly cross-examination emphasizing the lack of recovered stolen property and gaps in the State’s physical evidence—the appellant failed to show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Separately, the court audited the bill of costs and held that clerk-assessed fees must be supported by the record; it struck an unsupported $55 subpoena service fee where no return of service or evidence justified it. The court also held that an administrative bill of costs cannot override the trial court’s judgment on timing of payment; because the judgment made costs payable upon release, the appellant was not required to pay while confined. The convictions were affirmed, and the bill of costs was modified to delete the unsupported fee.
Litigation Takeaway
"IAC claims are hard to win when the record shows counsel was “in the fight”—courts evaluate the whole trial, not a checklist of alleged missteps. In family cases (especially termination), build a record reflecting active advocacy and strategy to blunt Strickland attacks. Also, don’t accept boilerplate costs at face value: line-item audit bills of cost and move to strike fees not supported by the record, and enforce decree/judgment language on when costs are actually payable (e.g., not until release from confinement)."
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal."