Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
786 opinions found
EDWARD VINSON, Appellant V. SECRETARY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES, Appellee
COA02
In Edward Vinson v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the appellant filed a notice of appeal but failed to do the basic steps required to prosecute it—he did not arrange payment for the clerk’s record and did not file the mandatory docketing statement. After the trial court clerk reported nonpayment, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals issued formal notices giving Vinson a reasonable opportunity to cure (including a 10-day deadline). When he still provided no proof of payment and did not file the docketing statement, the court applied TRAP 32.1 (docketing statement requirement), TRAP 35.3(a)(2) (appellant must arrange payment for clerk’s record), and the dismissal authorities in TRAP 37.3(b) and 42.3(b), and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. The court also taxed costs against the appellant under TRAP 43.4.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas appellate deadlines and “housekeeping” requirements aren’t optional. If an appellant doesn’t pay for the clerk’s record or comply with required filings after notice, the appeal can be dismissed before the merits are ever briefed—making record-payment defaults a practical way for an appellee (including in family cases) to end a stalling “zombie” appeal and restore finality."
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
"To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting."
RCIS ENTERPRISES, LLC, Appellant v. HOUSER FABRICATION, LLC, Appellee
COA06
RCIS Enterprises, LLC appealed a bench-trial judgment in favor of Houser Fabrication, LLC for breach of contract that awarded $78,491.10 in damages, prompt-payment interest, and attorney’s fees. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the City of Keller legal-sufficiency standard. It upheld the trial court’s finding that a binding contract existed, reasoning that the parties’ testimony and course of performance supplied the essential terms with reasonable certainty and supported a meeting of the minds. But the court concluded the evidence did not provide a legally sufficient evidentiary bridge between the admitted invoices/testimony and the exact dollar amount awarded, so the specific damages figure could not stand. It also held the record did not establish the statutory predicates for Texas Prompt Payment Act interest, requiring that interest award to be reversed. Because the principal recovery and interest were altered on appeal, the prevailing-party posture and “results obtained” changed, so the attorney-fee award was reversed and remanded for redetermination and recalculation consistent with the modified recovery.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a bench trial, findings of fact won’t save a money judgment if the record doesn’t support the exact numbers. Tie every damages/valuation line item to specific exhibits and testimony, and build evidence for statutory interest predicates. If the recovery may be reduced on appeal, preserve the fee award by developing Arthur Andersen evidence (and segregation where needed), because changes to the “bottom line” often force a fee remand."
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful."
In the Interest of I.H., A Child
COA02
A father challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not transported from jail for his trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the father's history of substance abuse and his repeated refusal to submit to court-ordered drug testing, concluding that such refusals create a legal inference of ongoing drug use. The court held that this "presumption of use," combined with the child's drug exposure at birth, supported an endangerment finding. Additionally, the court held that because the father's attorney did not explicitly raise a constitutional objection to the father's absence during the trial, those due process claims were waived for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Refusing a court-ordered drug test is not a neutral act; Texas courts treat a refusal as substantive evidence of illegal drug use and child endangerment. Furthermore, if a parent is unable to attend a hearing, counsel must explicitly cite constitutional due process grounds on the record to preserve the right to appeal that absence."
In re Juan Pardo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Juan Pardo sought to vacate trial court orders for his arrest via ex parte writs of attachment. Although Pardo was represented by two attorneys of record, he filed the petition pro se. The Real Party in Interest moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.' The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a party in a civil case cannot represent themselves while concurrently being represented by counsel. Because the petition was procedurally improper, the court dismissed it without prejudice and lifted a previously granted emergency stay, effectively exposing the Relator to the trial court's enforcement orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pro se filings made by a party who is still represented by counsel of record are considered a procedural nullity. Clients must formalize the termination of their legal representation before attempting to file original proceedings independently, or they risk immediate dismissal and the loss of emergency stays."
RANCHO DE LOS ARBOLES LLC AND ELLEN EAKIN v. TOWN OF CROSS ROADS, TX
COA02
Rancho De Los Arboles LLC and its principal sued the Town of Cross Roads after the Town began enforcing zoning ordinances to shut down their long-running short‑term rental use. Rancho sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging Texas-constitutional property violations (including takings/due course of law theories) and asserting ultra vires conduct. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and the trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Applying the Miranda plea-to-the-jurisdiction framework, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that a dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the pleadings or record affirmatively negate jurisdiction as a matter of law (i.e., the defect is incurable). Where the problem is merely insufficient pleading of jurisdictional facts that could be cured by amendment—such as failing to plead takings elements with specificity or failing to name the proper officials for an ultra vires claim—the plaintiff must be given a chance to replead. The court affirmed dismissal of those claims that were jurisdictionally barred on the record, but held the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing the remainder with prejudice without allowing Rancho an opportunity to amend. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the potentially curable constitutional and ultra vires theories.
Litigation Takeaway
"A plea to the jurisdiction is not automatically a “case killer.” If governmental immunity is raised and your petition is merely thin—not incurably barred—push hard for the right to amend. Preserve error by requesting leave to replead and objecting to any “with prejudice” dismissal, especially when asserting constitutional property/takings or ultra vires claims tied to real estate value in a divorce-related crossover dispute."
EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
COA02
In Moody v. State, the defendant challenged a felony DWI conviction, arguing (1) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for a compelled blood draw and (2) the State failed to prove the two prior DWI convictions (“jurisdictional priors”) required to elevate the offense to a felony. Applying the highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances review and the “four corners” rule, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause where the affidavit described a vehicle accident, witness reports that the defendant smelled of alcohol and threw beer cans into a ditch, the officer’s own odor-of-alcohol observation, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission he drank two 24-ounce beers. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to link Moody to the 1995 and 2022 DWI judgments for enhancement purposes; remoteness did not undermine the priors’ validity, and the State provided documentation and corroborating testimony connecting Moody to those convictions. The court affirmed the felony DWI conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody and SAPCR cases, don’t dismiss “old” alcohol-related convictions or a parent’s calm demeanor during an incident. Build an endangerment narrative using (1) certified priors (even decades old) and (2) contemporaneous, concrete “four corners” facts from police/fire/witness reports (accident details, odor, discarded containers, refusals, admissions) to support testing requests and restrictions like supervised visitation."
Reginald Donell Rice v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit, holding that Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for the immediate dismissal of claims supported by false affidavits of poverty. The court analyzed the conflict between the specific requirements of Chapter 14 and the general procedural protections of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. It concluded that because Chapter 14 is a specialized statute designed to curb frivolous inmate litigation, trial courts have the discretion to dismiss such suits without holding an evidentiary hearing or requiring service of process if the inmate's certified trust account statement contradicts their claimed income.
Litigation Takeaway
"When facing a family law filing from an incarcerated parent, immediately subpoena their certified inmate trust account statement; any discrepancy between their deposits and their affidavit of indigence allows for a dismissal under Chapter 14 without the need for a hearing or service of process."
In the Interest of G.M.D. & V.D., Children and In the Interest of Z.J.M., A Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her three children. The case centered on the mother's long history of heroin addiction and untreated mental health crises, including a suicide attempt occurring while the children were present. In its analysis, the appellate court first determined that because the mother failed to challenge every legal "predicate ground" cited by the trial court in her appeal, those unchallenged findings became binding. Furthermore, applying the 'Holley' factors, the court found that the mother's recurring drug relapses and mental instability posed a significant danger to the children, making termination necessary for their safety and best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
"When appealing a termination of parental rights, an appellant must challenge every individual predicate ground found by the trial court; failing to contest even one ground can lead to an automatic affirmance. Additionally, evidence of chronic substance abuse and untreated mental illness remains a powerful factor in establishing that termination is in a child's best interest."